




RETROACTIVITY AND IMMIGRANT CRIMES 
SINCE ST. CYR:  EMERGING SIGNS  
OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
VASHTI D. VAN WYKE†
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1996 if a permanent resident was convicted of a crime 
that subjected her to deportation, she was often eligible to apply for a 
waiver of deportation, known as 212(c) relief.1  A waiver of deporta-
tion was granted under 212(c) if the immigrant could show substantial 
equitable ties with the United States, including a U.S. citizen spouse 
or children, U.S. business ownership, and employment in the United 
States.2  These 212(c) waivers were routinely granted in more than 
fifty percent of cases.3
In 1996, however, Congress overhauled immigration law through 
two bills—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA)4 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).5  A central goal of the bills was to 
facilitate the deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes.  To do 
this, AEDPA restricted and IIRIRA entirely eliminated the 212(c) 
waiver mechanism, meaning that permanent residents convicted of a 
greatly expanded list of crimes would be automatically deported, re-
gardless of how deeply connected they were with the United States. 
 † B.A. 1997, Wesleyan University; MALD 2001, Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy, Tufts University; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Pennsylvania.  My thanks to 
Professor Kermit Roosevelt, Sarah Greenberger, Donald Conklin, and Abby Wright for 
reviewing and editing this Comment.  All errors are my own. 
1 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 
Stat. 181, 187 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996)). 
2 See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing factors that courts use to de-
cide whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation). 
3 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (citing data regarding the preva-
lence of 212(c) relief between 1989 and 1995). 
4 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.). 
5 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8, 18 U.S.C.). 
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While prospective elimination of 212(c) relief was politically contro-
versial, it did not raise significant legal or constitutional questions.  
However, the Justice Department’s subsequent interpretation of 
IIRIRA as eliminating 212(c) relief retroactively6 for immigrants who 
committed their crimes or were convicted of their crimes while 212(c) 
relief was still available created a clear conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, embodied in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products.7  After six years of litigation and the wrongful deportation of 
many permanent residents deported without recourse to a 212(c) 
waiver, the Supreme Court corrected the Justice Department’s error, 
and the ratification of that error by many lower courts, in the land-
mark INS v. St. Cyr decision.8  In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that 
(1) the retroactivity framework of Landgraf functioned identically in 
immigration cases as in other cases; and (2) because Congress did not 
explicitly state that IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief applied retroac-
tively, the bill could not be used to deprive immigrants of 212(c) relief 
in a retroactive manner.9
While St. Cyr should have put an end to the controversy over 
212(c) relief, lower courts have continued to permit the deportation 
of permanent residents without recourse to 212(c) relief, even though 
they committed their crimes, proceeded to trial after rejecting a plea 
bargain, or were convicted of their crimes prior to passage of IIRIRA.10  
Lower courts have justified this retroactive application by narrowly 
limiting St. Cyr to its facts—the context of an accepted plea bargain—
and by giving only superficial consideration to Supreme Court prece-
dent in determining the relevant prior act for retroactivity analysis.  
However, two recent decisions, Ponnapula v. Ashcroft11 and Olatunji v. 
Ashcroft,12 from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth 
Circuits respectively, suggest that lower courts may finally begin to fol-
6 See In re Soriano, No. 3289, 1997 WL 33347804 (Att’y Gen. Feb. 21, 1997) (re-
porting a decision by Attorney General Reno that reversed a Board of Immigration 
Appeals opinion holding that the repeal of 212(c) was not retroactive). 
7 511 U.S. 244 (1994); see also infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the significance of the 
Landgraf decision). 
8 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
9 See id. at 315-25 (holding, based on the Landgraf two-part test, that an impermis-
sible retroactive effect would be created by removing access to 212(c) relief). 
10 See infra Part II.B (providing examples of lower courts’ misapplication of Land-
graf in immigration cases). 
11 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2004). 
12 387 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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low the fundamental dictate of St. Cyr, which is to fully apply the 
Landgraf retroactivity analysis to cases involving immigrants. 
The persistent failure of most lower courts to faithfully apply ret-
roactivity analysis to 212(c) cases is important in at least two respects.  
First, on the level of individual justice, the failure means that perma-
nent residents who actually qualify to apply for 212(c) waivers are still 
being summarily deported, leaving behind U.S. citizen spouses and 
children, businesses, employment, and community ties. 
Second, on the level of coherent jurisprudence, the failure means 
that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity framework has been bifur-
cated—there is one set of retroactivity rules primarily applied to cor-
porate defendants, and a second, much harsher set of retroactivity 
rules applied to immigrants convicted of crimes.13  Particular concern 
is raised by the fact that harsher rules are being applied to a small, 
unpopular, and politically weak group of people.  After all, one of the 
primary arguments against retroactive laws, voiced originally by the 
Framers of the Constitution,14 is that such laws can be used by the gov-
ernment to target unpopular and weak groups, by heaping conse-
quence upon consequence well after those individuals have acted.  
Just such a result has materialized in the case of immigrants and 
212(c) relief.  Conforming the lower courts’ 212(c) decisions to the 
13 See infra Part III.E (discussing the continuing double standard in retroactivity 
analysis).  From a legal realist perspective, an interesting phenomenon has developed 
in the area of 212(c) retroactivity.  Conservative judges, who generally support law en-
forcement measures, see Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology:  The Case of the Supreme 
Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 74, 84-85 (2005) (illustrating the ten-
dency of the conservative members of the Rehnquist Court to vote against prisoners), 
have actually led the way toward full application of the Landgraf framework to 212(c) 
cases⎯which, in practice, serves to benefit immigrants convicted of crimes.  For exam-
ple, Justice Thomas has urged a rethinking of the exemption of civil laws from the Ex 
Post Facto clause in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538-39 (1998) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  See also infra note 71 (contextualizing Justice Thomas’s beliefs about ret-
roactive civil laws).  In addition, Judge Luttig, who is generally identified as a conserva-
tive, see Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”:  What’s Right and Wrong with Conservative 
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 235 (2000), authored the Fourth Circuit’s Ola-
tunji decision, 387 F.3d 383, which struck down the retroactive application of an 
IIRIRA provision.  Also, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 
363 (1999), offers the most probing review of the concept of retroactivity.  Meanwhile, 
Janet Reno, Attorney General to Democratic President Bill Clinton, was responsible for 
originally applying the repeal of 212(c) retroactively to all immigrants, regardless of 
when their crimes were committed.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describ-
ing Reno’s interpretation of IIRIRA as eliminating 212(c) relief retroactively). 
14 See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Federalists’ advo-
cacy for a ban on retroactivity in the Constitution). 
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Supreme Court’s basic retroactivity framework will go far in prevent-
ing this invidious result. 
This Comment argues that, since St. Cyr, the lower courts have not 
followed the Supreme Court’s mandate to fully apply the Landgraf 
framework to 212(c) cases in two important ways.  First, they have 
failed to recognize that retroactivity analysis is fundamentally con-
cerned with statutory construction (i.e., whether the language of the 
statute indicates its temporal scope and the class to which the statute 
applies), coupled with a presumption against retroactivity.  Instead, 
they have incorrectly introduced an individual reliance requirement 
into the Landgraf test.  Thus, even where the law would not apply to a 
broad class of people because of the presumption against retroactivity, 
lower courts have found that individual members of that class have 
not “earned” the right to be protected from retroactive application 
because they did not actually rely on the prior state of the law. 
Despite the lower courts’ misinterpretation of St. Cyr, the recent 
circuit court decisions in Ponnapula v. Ashcroft and Olatunji v. Ashcroft 
have made significant strides toward full application of Landgraf to 
immigration cases by holding that reliance is not a requirement for a 
finding of impermissible retroactive effect.15  Given the holdings of St. 
Cyr and Landgraf, this is clearly the correct conclusion and should be 
followed by the remaining circuits.  Nonetheless, a split among the 
circuits has developed on this question, with the Third16 and Fourth17 
holding that individual reliance is not a requirement for a finding of 
impermissible retroactivity, and the Second18 and Ninth19 Circuits 
holding that an individualized assessment is appropriate.  Given this 
split and the question’s importance for retroactivity jurisprudence 
15 See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 491 (“The Supreme Court has never required actual 
reliance or evidence thereof in the Landgraf line of cases, and has in fact assiduously 
eschewed an actual reliance requirement.”); Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 388-89 (“[W]e hold 
that reliance (whether subjective or objective) is not a requirement of impermissible 
retroactivity and that the government’s notice is insufficient to overcome the imper-
missibly retroactive effect of IIRIRA on Olatunji’s guilty plea.”). 
16 Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 491. 
17 Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 388-89. 
18 See Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because those aliens who 
went to trial prior to the elimination of § 212(c) cannot show that they altered their 
conduct in reliance on the availability of such relief, we hold that IIRIRA’s repeal of  
§ 212(c) relief is not impermissibly retroactive as applied to them.”). 
19 See Kelava v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We have cabined St. 
Cyr to the plea context, because of the alien’s reliance on existing law in that situa-
tion.”). 
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more broadly, the Supreme Court should step in to resolve the ques-
tion. 
Second, the lower courts have failed to follow the Landgraf line of 
cases on the question of which past conduct is protected from retroac-
tive application of new laws.  Currently, in the 212(c) context, no cir-
cuit views the immigrant’s commission of the crime as the essential 
conduct for analysis.  This means that if a permanent resident com-
mitted her crime in 1990, for example, while 212(c) relief was still 
available, but was not convicted until after 1996, she would not be 
deemed eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation.  This consensus 
has developed despite the fact that under a complete Landgraf analy-
sis, and particularly when considering the decisional rules offered in 
Martin v. Hadix,20 the commission of the crime is the only logical point 
of analysis to determine an impermissible retroactive effect. Under 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if an immigrant committed a 
crime while 212(c) relief was still available, she should be deemed eli-
gible to apply for a waiver of deportation; to hold otherwise would 
create an impermissible retroactive effect. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutory Evolution of 212(c) Relief 
For at least a century, federal immigration control laws have pro-
vided for the deportation of noncitizens, including permanent resi-
dents, who have been convicted of certain crimes.21  Before the 1996 
20 527 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1999).  Two potential decisional rules are offered in Mar-
tin v. Hadix to determine which past act is relevant for retroactivity analysis.  The ma-
jority and dissenting opinions both suggest the following rule:  At what point could the 
party have avoided all the consequences of the new law?  Id. at 357-58, 369.  Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion suggests asking what activity the statute was intended to 
regulate.  Id. at 363.  The rules proposed in Martin v. Hadix are discussed in more de-
tail later in Part III.C.  
21 The definition of the crimes that render immigrants eligible for deportation has 
changed over the years.  For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 
1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78 (amended 1952) (repealed 1996), 
made crimes “involving moral turpitude” deportable offenses.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 294 (2001) (citing the 1917 Act and noting its operation).  The Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4469, 4469-70 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), added deportation for conviction of an “aggravated fel-
ony,” which included murder and any drug trafficking crimes.  By 1994, the INA pro-
vided for deportation of immigrants convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude, or 
one crime of moral turpitude within five years of entry plus a conviction for a crime for 
which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I-II) (Supp. V 1994) (establishing grounds for deportation).  But 
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changes to federal immigration law, deportation was not mandatory 
or automatic; immigration statutes in force prior to 1996 each con-
tained a mechanism for discretionary waivers of deportation if the 
immigrant possessed certain qualifications or other equities warranted 
a waiver.22  The Immigration Act of 1917 included a discretionary 
waiver process through the Secretary of Labor,23 while the more mod-
ern statutes gave that power to the Attorney General through the 
212(c) mechanism.24
Before 1990, permanent residents25 who were convicted of a de-
portable offense and had lived continuously in the United States for 
seven years were permitted to apply for a waiver of deportation from 
the Attorney General.26  Changes to 212(c) in 1990 further restricted 
eligibility for such waivers.27  These changes meant that immigrants 
these provisions all provided for a 212(c) waiver of deportation under meritorious cir-
cumstances.  For a discussion of the development of 212(c) legislation over the last 
century, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-97. 
22 See INA of 1917 § 3 (providing for discretionary relief from deportation as de-
termined by the Secretary of Labor); INA of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 
Stat. 181, 187 (1952) (amended 1990) (repealed 1996) (providing for discretionary 
relief from deportation as determined by the Attorney General).  The discretionary 
waivers in both the 1917 Act and 1952 Act explicitly regulated only exclusion proceed-
ings, where a lawfully admitted immigrant who temporarily proceeded abroad sought 
readmission into the United States.  Both Acts, however, were interpreted to apply to 
deportation proceedings as well.  See, e.g., In re L., 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 6 (B.I.A. 1940), 
available at 1940 WL 7544 (holding under the 1917 Act that deportation proceedings 
were governed by the INA’s standards for exclusion of immigrants from readmission); 
In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976), available at 1976 WL 32326 (holding the 
same under the 1952 Act).  The BIA is the appellate body that reviews decisions made 
by immigration judges. 
23 See INA of 1917 § 3 (giving the Secretary of Labor discretionary power to waive 
deportation). 
24 See INA of 1952 § 212(c) (designating the Attorney General as the official pos-
sessing the discretionary waiver power). 
25 This Comment refers to lawful permanent residents as immigrants, LPRs, or 
permanent residents.  In legal statutes and scholarly writing, another common desig-
nation for an LPR is “permanent resident alien.”  However, that term is avoided here 
because of the negative connotations of the word “alien.”  See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, 
Expanding the Circle of Membership by Reconstructing the “Alien”:  Lessons from Social Psychol-
ogy and the “Promise Enforcement” Cases, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 47 (1998) (discussing 
the pejorative connotations of the word). 
26 See INA of 1952 § 212(c) (permitting a permanent resident to apply for a waiver 
if she could show seven years of continuous residency). 
27 Congress amended the INA in 1990 to remove 212(c) relief from immigrants 
convicted of aggravated felonies who had served at least 5 years in jail.  INA of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit. V, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 5048, 5052 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(c)) (repealed 1996); see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (detailing changes in 
212(c) eligibility). 
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were not permitted to apply for 212(c) relief if they had been con-
victed of an “aggravated felony” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) 
(1994)28 and, in addition, had actually served at least five years in 
prison.29
Prior to IIRIRA’s passage, the 212(c) relief mechanism worked in 
the following manner:  If an immigrant who had lived continuously in 
the United States for seven years was convicted of a deportable of-
fense, she could then be ordered deported by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS).30  After receiving an order to appear to 
answer the deportation charge, she was eligible to apply for 212(c) re-
lief from the Attorney General if she had not been convicted of an ag-
gravated felony, or had been convicted of an aggravated felony but 
had served less than five years in prison.31  The immigrant would then 
make her case for the waiver at an administrative hearing before an 
Immigration Judge (IJ).  There was a “strong likelihood that such re-
lief would be granted” by the IJ.32  One study showed that 212(c) relief 
was granted in 51.5% of final decisions in cases between 1989 and 
1995,33 and more than 10,000 immigrants received waiver grants dur-
ing that same period.34
The IJ’s decision whether to grant 212(c) relief was guided by a 
longstanding Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) standard.35  Factors 
to be considered included:  “[T]he seriousness of the offense, evi-
dence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration of the alien’s 
28 The statute lists twenty-one categories of crime that are defined as “aggravated 
felonies,” including, inter alia, murder, drug trafficking, and illicit dealing in firearms. 
29 See INA of 1990 § 511 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
297 (discussing changes implemented by 1990 statute). 
30 See e.g., Mapp v. Reno, No. CV-99-4240, 2000 WL 1911424, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 
14, 2000) (noting the procedural steps required in an immigration case involving de-
portation and 212(c)). 
31 See § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996) (setting forth 212(c) eligibility).  This five-
year cap on the amount of time an immigrant could serve in prison for an aggravated 
felony and still be eligible to apply for 212(c) relief will be referred to as the “time-
served” provision in this Comment. 
32 Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2004); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
at 296 n.5 (discussing the high rate of 212(c) grants). 
33 Julie K. Rannik, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:  A Death 
Sentence for the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 123, 137 n.80 (1996); see 
also Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[I]n the years immediately preced-
ing the statute’s passage, over half the applications were granted.”). 
34 See Rannick, supra note 33, at 137 n.80 (listing the number of 212(c) waivers 
granted annually from 1989 to 1995). 
35 The oft-cited source for the standard is In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 
1978), available at 1978 WL 36472.   
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residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the number of 
citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed 
Forces.”36  If the crime was particularly serious, the immigrant would 
have to show more equities to outweigh the harm of the offense.37  
The policy underlying the availability of relief was that once an immi-
grant had paid for her crime within the criminal justice system, the 
United States would benefit more from her continued presence than 
from her deportation, which would cause disruptions to her family in 
the United States, her business or employer, and her other commu-
nity ties.38
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).39  Section 440(d) of AEDPA 
excluded numerous classes of immigrants from eligibility for 212(c) 
relief, including immigrants “ordered deported because of a convic-
tion for an aggravated felony, for a drug conviction, for certain weap-
ons or national security violations, and for multiple convictions involv-
ing crimes of moral turpitude.”40  AEDPA also removed the five-year 
“time served” qualification of the 1990 INA.41  Getting rid of this pro-
vision meant that immigrants who were convicted of acts that techni-
cally qualified as aggravated felonies, but who received only a sus-
pended sentence because the circumstances of their crime rendered 
them virtually blameless, would now receive mandatory deportations.42
36 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 296 n.5 (noting that these criteria are set forth in In re Marin, 
16  I. & N. Dec. at 585-85). 
37 See Anjali Parekh Prakash, Changing the Rules:  Arguing Against Retroactive Applica-
tion of Deportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1430 n.74 (1997) (“Where the of-
fense is extremely severe, a heightened showing of ‘unusual or outstanding equities’ is 
required.”). 
38 See Kati L. Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation:  Private Immigration 
Bills and Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 273, 288 (2004) (“A 
careful consideration of the factors allowed immigration judges to weigh the LPR’s 
overall value to her family and community against any potential danger posed to soci-
ety.”).
39 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.). 
40 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 n.7. 
41 AEDPA § 440. 
42 See James F. Smith, United States Immigration Law as We Know It:  El Clandestino, 
the American Gulag, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 747, 769 
(2005) (“Many common misdemeanor offenses, such as petty theft (shoplifting) or 
simple assault, qualify as aggravated felonies because they are punishable by a maxi-
mum of one year, even if the common state sentencing schemes of probation or com-
munity service and a suspended sentence are imposed.”). 
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On September 30, 1996, just five months after the passage of 
AEDPA, Congress acted to further expedite deportation of immi-
grants convicted of crimes, by enacting IIRIRA.43  Among other 
changes, IIRIRA repealed 212(c) relief completely,44 and replaced it 
with a much narrower relief mechanism called cancellation of re-
moval.45  A permanent resident is only eligible for cancellation of re-
moval if she has not been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” regard-
less of the amount of time she served in jail.46
Further increasing the restrictive nature of the new law, IIRIRA 
redefined the term “aggravated felony” to encompass scores of new 
offenses, including misdemeanors and low-level felonies47 that are not 
understood to be aggravated felonies in any other context.48  In addi-
tion, Congress made this redefinition of “aggravated felony” explicitly 
retroactive to crimes committed before passage of IIRIRA, a result 
that has been upheld, and properly so, by the courts.49  These IIRIRA 
43 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
44 IIRIRA § 304(b). 
45 IRIIRA § 304(a)(3).  IIRIRA also replaced the term “deportation” with the term 
“removal,” making “cancellation of removal” the semantic equivalent of a “waiver of 
deportation.”  Id. 
46 Id. (outlining the eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal). 
47 See IIRIRA § 321 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); see also Ponnapula v. Ash-
croft, 373 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The definition of ‘aggravated felony’ has been 
retroactively expanded to include dozens more offenses, including misdemeanor and 
low-level felony offenses.”).  This congressional redefinition of “aggravated felony,” 
though contrary to statutory precedent and normal usage, has been upheld by the 
courts.  See id. at 486 (noting that courts have upheld this expanded definition and 
providing examples in which misdemeanors were held to be aggravated felonies).  
Therefore, minor offenses have resulted in the deportation of immigrants who, in 
many cases, had lived in the United States almost their entire lives and had no ties to 
the country to which they were deported.  See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 
148, 149-50, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a misdemeanor theft of a video game 
punished by a one-year suspended sentence is an aggravated felony under the redefini-
tion and affirming an order of deportation of the immigrant to a country in which he 
had not lived since he was six years old); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792-93 
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a misdemeanor petty larceny offense is an aggravated fel-
ony under the redefinition). 
48 See Graham, 169 F.3d at 792-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that, in fact, misde-
meanors qualify as felonies under the redefinition, and reasoning that Congress simply 
made a drafting error in choosing the term “aggravated felony”). 
49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(including any effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction 
was entered before, on, or after [September 30, 1996].”).  The retroactive application 
of the definition of “aggravated felony” to convictions obtained before the passage of 
IIRIRA is permissible because (1) Congress explicitly mandated the retroactive appli-
cation; (2) deportation is interpreted to be a civil, not a criminal penalty, and so is not 
subject to ex post facto protections; and (3) the retroactive application is not otherwise 
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changes made immigrants automatically deportable if they had been 
convicted of crimes that fell within the new, very broad definition of 
“aggravated felony.” 
B.  Early Interpretations of 212(c) Relief and Retroactivity 
Following the passage of AEDPA, questions immediately arose 
about the scope of the legislation’s strict limits on 212(c) eligibility—
did the new limits apply only prospectively or retroactively as well?  
The BIA held, in a 7-5 decision, that AEDPA’s 212(c) eligibility limits 
did not apply retroactively to cases already pending before the courts.50  
Attorney General Janet Reno reversed that holding pursuant to her 
power to review BIA decisions51 and held instead that AEDPA’s 212(c) 
changes applied retroactively as well.52  Basing her opinion on the ret-
roactivity framework of Landgraf, the Attorney General held that ap-
plying AEDPA’s restrictions to immigrants already convicted of their 
crimes did not have an impermissible retroactive effect because (1) 
the decision of whether to grant a 212(c) waiver of deportation was a 
question of prospective relief, and “[p]ast conduct is relevant only inso-
far as it may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain in the 
U.S.”;53 and (2) AEDPA only changed jurisdictional aspects of 212(c) 
relief—i.e., who was eligible to apply for relief, which is purely discre-
tionary—rather than any substantive right to receive the relief.  The 
Attorney General held that removal of a merely discretionary oppor-
tunity, as opposed to a vested right, did not create a retroactive ef-
fect.54
The Attorney General’s cramped interpretation, which was re-
jected in full by the Supreme Court in St. Cyr, permitted the automatic 
unconstitutional.  Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (“If the 
statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does 
not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.”). 
50 See In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 1996), available at 1996 WL 426888, 
rev’d, No. 3289, 1997 WL 33347804 (Att’y Gen. Feb. 21, 1997). 
51 The Attorney General’s authority to review BIA decisions at the time of In re 
Soriano was provided for in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1997).  Today, the Attorney General 
maintains the power to review BIA decisions under revised regulations located at 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2002). 
52 See In re Soriano, 1997 WL 33347804 (reporting a decision by Attorney General 
Reno that reversed a Board of Immigration Appeals opinion holding that the repeal of 
212(c) was not retroactive). 
53 Nadine K. Wettstein, Attorney General Issues Soriano § 212(c) Decision, 74 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 326, 326 (1997). 
54 See id. at 327 (noting that the “Attorney General rejected the argument that 
AEDPA § 440(d) implicates a substantive right to relief from deportation”). 
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deportation of immigrants who committed their crimes while 212(c) 
was still available, as well as immigrants who made legal and tactical 
decisions about their criminal defense while 212(c) was still available, 
but who had not yet received a final decision on their 212(c) applica-
tion.55
Litigants challenged the Attorney General’s decision in the circuit 
courts from 1997 until the St. Cyr decision in 2002.56  Until the Su-
preme Court intervened in St. Cyr, the circuits were split as to whether 
AEDPA’s restrictions on and IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) had an imper-
missible retroactive effect as applied to immigrants who were convicted 
prior to the statutory changes.57  The circuits agreed, however, that no 
55 See id. (summarizing the practical results of the Attorney General’s interpreta-
tion). 
56 See Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere:  The Strange Quality of Supreme Court 
Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 413 n.2 (2002) (acknowledging six attorneys and the 
ACLU Immigrants Rights Project who “labored so long and hard” to reverse the Attor-
ney General’s opinion in Soriano, which culminated in the St. Cyr decision). 
57 The circuit courts that sided with the Attorney General on this issue generally 
reiterated the two arguments made in In re Soriano.  The Third Circuit’s decision in 
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999), is representative of this group of deci-
sions.  In DeSousa, the court held, first, that there was significant textual support to 
conclude that Congress intended to make AEDPA’s limitations on 212(c) relief retro-
active to pre-enactment convictions.  See id. at 186 (“By implication then, we can as-
sume that Congress intended for § 440(d), which amended § 212(c), to apply to all 
convictions, regardless of their date.”).  Second, DeSousa concluded that no impermis-
sible retroactive effect would be caused by applying AEDPA’s 212(c) limitations to pre-
vious convictions.  Id. at 187.  The court so concluded for two reasons.  First, the con-
sequences of the criminal act were the same both before and after passage of AEDPA, 
namely “possible criminal sanctions and deportation.”  Id. (quoting Scheidemann v. 
INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1523 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Second, the court held that the only relevant 
change made by AEDPA involved the scope of the Attorney General’s discretion to 
grant relief, and “[l]ike statutes altering the standards for injunctive relief, this change 
has only a prospective impact.”  Id. (quoting Scheidemann, 83 F.3d at 1523). 
 On the other side of the debate was the Second Circuit’s decision in the St. Cyr 
case, which the Supreme Court later affirmed.  See St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 417-18 
(2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  The Second Circuit discussed the complex-
ity of the split among the circuits, noting that the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits 
adopted the INS view that AEDPA’s limitations on 212(c) eligibility did apply to pre-
enactment convictions; the First and Ninth Circuits held that AEDPA’s limitations did 
not apply to immigrants who can show they pleaded guilty in reliance on the availabil-
ity of 212(c) relief; the Fourth Circuit adopted a blanket rule that AEDPA’s limitations 
did not apply to any immigrant whose conviction was based on a guilty plea; and the 
Seventh Circuit held that AEDPA’s limitations applied to pre-enactment guilty pleas, 
unless an immigrant “had conceded deportability, despite a colorable defense” in reli-
ance on the availability of the 212(c) waiver.  The cases catalogued by the Second Cir-
cuit’s St. Cyr opinion are found at Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2000); Tasios 
v. Reno, 204 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2000); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 612 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1999); DeSousa 
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impermissible retroactive effect was created by applying the new stat-
utes to immigrants who committed their crimes before the changes, but 
were convicted after the changes.58
II.   RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS AND ITS (MIS)APPLICATION IN THE 
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT 
Fundamentally, retroactivity analysis in the civil context is a ques-
tion of statutory construction, with a strong presumption against ret-
roactive application.  A civil statute applies retroactively only where 
the statute itself clearly so requires; if the statute is silent on the ques-
tion of temporal scope, then the new law will only be applied prospec-
tively.59  In the immigration context, however, many lower courts have 
incorrectly introduced a subjective reliance requirement into this 
analysis.  This is inconsistent with how statutory construction and the 
presumption against retroactivity work.  Once a court determines that 
the scope of a statute is not expressly retroactive as to a class of peo-
ple—i.e., people who undertook a certain conduct before enactment 
of the new law—then that entire class is protected from the new law by 
the presumption against retroactivity.  To require proof of subjective 
reliance is to engage in judicial legislation; the court is choosing to 
apply a statute retroactively to certain individuals, even though the 
statute does not expressly mandate such application as to the entire 
class. 
A.  The Framework for Retroactivity Analysis 
Retroactivity has been disfavored since the founding of the 
American legal system.  In the civil context, this disfavor is embodied 
in the Landgraf decision and is expressly required in the immigration 
context by St. Cyr. 
190 F.3d at 185; Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1147 (10th Cir. 1999); Turk-
han v. Perryman, 188 F.3d 814, 827 (7th Cir. 1999); and LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 
1041 (7th Cir. 1998). 
58 The most widely cited justification for this holding is one sentence of unsup-
ported dicta from LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041.  “It would border on the absurd to argue 
that these aliens might have decided not to commit drug crimes, or might have re-
sisted conviction more vigorously, had they known that . . . when their prison term 
ended, [if] ordered deported, they could not ask for a discretionary waiver of deporta-
tion.”  Id.  See infra Part III.A for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
59 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286-87 (1994) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“[T]here exists a judicial presumption, of great antiquity, that a legislative en-
actment affecting substantive rights does not apply retroactively absent clear statement to 
the contrary.”). 
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1.  The Historical Roots of Retroactivity 
The notion that the government should not retroactively attach 
new legal consequences to past acts was a central founding legal prin-
ciple of the United States, with roots in English common law and ear-
lier Roman law, and has persisted as a broad and settled principle of 
modern jurisprudence.60  Retroactivity is constitutionally impermissi-
ble in the criminal context under the Ex Post Facto Clause61 and is 
heavily disfavored in the civil context.62
Opposition to retroactive rulemaking was of great importance to 
the Framers of the Constitution.63  Professor Natelson suggests that 
the issue of retroactivity was “central to the constitutional bargain” 
and that the Federalists were staunch advocates for including a ban on 
retroactivity in the Constitution.64
60 Justice Scalia has argued that the “principle that the legal effect of conduct 
should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place 
has timeless and universal human appeal.”  Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bon-
jorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).  The longstanding nature of 
this principle is clear, as noted by one early New York case:  “It is a principle of the 
English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent 
parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect.”  Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).  Roman legal scholars were opposed to retroactive applications of 
the law; one Roman legal maxim held that “[t]he penalty for a past wrong is never in-
creased ex post facto.”  See Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity:  The Founders’ View, 
39 IDAHO L. REV. 489, 499-501 (2003) (discussing the opposition to retroactivity under 
Roman law).  Antiretroactivity was of central importance to the Framers during the 
drafting of the U.S. Constitution.  See id. at 499 (noting the importance of opposition 
to ex post facto laws for many of the Framers).  Antiretroactivity was emphasized in the 
Federalist Papers.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 278-79 ( James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws impairing the obli-
gation of contracts are contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to 
every principle of sound legislation.”).  The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the 
historic roots of antiretroactivity in its seminal civil retroactivity decision.  See Landgraf, 
511 U.S. at 265 (“[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in 
our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Repub-
lic.”). 
61 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall 
be passed.”); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (Chase, J.) (hold-
ing that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to criminal 
cases). 
62 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272 (“[W]hile the constitutional impediments to retroac-
tive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default 
rule.”). 
63 See Natelson, supra note 60, at 491-94 (noting the centrality of retroactivity issues 
to the framing of the Constitution). 
64 See id. at 492-93.  Natelson argues that the Federalists compromised on the issue 
of retroactivity in order to obtain ratification.  Id. at 527.  While many Federalists 
thought the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply in both criminal and civil contexts, they 
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Justice Story, sitting on the Circuit Court of New Hampshire in So-
ciety for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, articulated his influential 
definition of retroactivity, which the Landgraf Court adopted:65  “Upon 
principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights ac-
quired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new 
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or consid-
erations already past, must be deemed retrospective.”66
The serious policy concerns presented by retroactive laws are ob-
vious and oft-repeated.  These include a fear of government abuse,67 
upsetting settled expectations of individuals and groups,68 the danger 
of using retroactive laws to injure unpopular groups,69 and predictabil-
ity concerns.70
compromised on this issue by representing that “the Ex Post Facto Clauses did not bar 
all forms of retroactivity, but only strongly retroactive criminal laws.”  Id.  Therefore, 
Natelson concludes that Calder v. Bull, which restricted the Ex Post Facto Clause to 
criminal laws, was probably correctly decided.  Id. at 494.  The Landgraf decision notes 
that James Madison opposed retroactive laws as “contrary to the first principles of the 
social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.”  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267 
n.20 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison)).  Madison also argued that 
retroactive laws were particularly pernicious in that they could benefit the “influential” 
class over the “more industrious and less informed part of the community.”  Id. (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison)). 
65 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268-69 (approving of Justice Story’s definition). 
66 Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) 
(Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.N.H. 1814).  The Landgraf opinion notes that the Supreme 
Court has formulated the definition of retroactivity in various ways, but all have re-
tained a “similar functional conceptions” to Justice Story’s definition of retroactivity.  
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269.  The Landgraf opinion collects several iterations of the defi-
nition of a retroactive law, including a law that “changes the legal consequences of acts 
completed before its effective date,” id. at 269 n.23 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 
U.S. 24, 31 (1981)); one that gives “a quality or effect to acts or conduct which they did 
not have or did not contemplate when they were performed,” id. (quoting Union Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)); and one that “takes 
away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,” id. (quoting Sturges v. Carter, 114 
U.S. 511, 519 (1884)).  Note that the terms “retrospective” and “retroactive” are used 
interchangeably in retroactivity jurisprudence. 
67 See, e.g., Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 (suggesting that the Ex Post Facto Clause “re-
stricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legisla-
tion”). 
68 See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 (“Elementary considerations of fairness dic-
tate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to con-
form their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”); 
see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (“Retroactive legisla-
tion presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by pro-
spective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset 
settled transactions.”). 
69 See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (“[The legislature’s] responsivity to political 
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In Calder v. Bull the Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause expressly prohibits retroactive criminal laws, but not retroac-
tive civil laws.71  Because the Supreme Court has long held that depor-
tation is only a civil remedy rather than a criminal penalty,72 even 
when the deportation is based on a criminal conviction,73 the Ex Post 
pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of 
retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.”).  Landgraf also cites several 
other authorities on this point, including City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The constitutional prohibitions 
against . . . ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use 
of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens.”); 
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (“[Retroactive laws may have] a pur-
pose not to prevent dangerous conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty 
against specific persons or classes of persons.”); and Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme 
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV.  692, 693 (1960) 
(noting that a retroactive law “may be passed with an exact knowledge of who will 
benefit from it”).  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267 n.20. 
70 On this point, Landgraf cites Professor Munzer:  “The rule of law . . . is a defea-
sible entitlement of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in 
advance.”  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 n.18 (quoting Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Ret-
roactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471 (1982)).  Traditionally, the focus of pre-
dictability concerns has been on commercial transactions, contracts, and property.  See 
id. at 271 (noting the historic focus of retroactivity jurisprudence on commercial top-
ics).  Landgraf highlights eight Supreme Court decisions that applied the presumption 
against retroactivity in the commercial context.  See id. at 271 n.25 (citing inter alia 
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79-82 (1982); Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 
637 (1914); and Twenty per Cent. Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 179, 187 (1874)). 
71 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798) (Chase, J.) (“I do not think 
[the Ex Post Facto Clause] was inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights, of ei-
ther property, or contracts.”); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 n.19 (reaffirming that Cal-
der v. Bull governs whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to civil laws).  While the 
division between civil and criminal law in Calder has become a matter of faith for the 
courts, Justice Thomas has expressed disdain for the Calder holding and an interest in 
revisiting the entire question of what laws are prohibited under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In 
an appropriate case, therefore, I would be willing to reconsider Calder and its progeny 
to determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Tak-
ings Clause jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.”). 
72 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (holding that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause poses no restriction to the civil remedy of deportation proceed-
ings); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (same); see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 
U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (declining to overturn Galvan or Harisiades). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 831, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that 
it is well-established that a deportation proceeding for a convicted immigrant is not a 
criminal penalty but a civil procedure to determine the right to remain in the country 
(citing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594)).  However, persuasive arguments have been made 
that deportation based on a criminal conviction is clearly punishment, and so should 
be subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause’s restrictions.  Third Circuit Judge Sarokin wrote 
the following: 
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Facto Clause does not directly govern questions of retroactivity and 
deportation, including the repeal of 212(c) relief.  Nevertheless, deci-
sions regarding retroactivity in the civil context routinely cite to Ex 
Post Facto Clause cases as persuasive authority,74 because the Clause 
demonstrates the general disdain our system has for retroactive laws. 
2.  Landgraf and Its Progeny 
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court provided the 
modern framework for analysis of retroactivity questions in the civil 
context.75  Landgraf ’s two-part test is fundamentally a rule of statutory 
construction with a strong presumption against retroactivity, unless 
Congress has expressly mandated otherwise.76  Landgraf ’s test does not 
include an individualized assessment of whether a particular defen-
dant has relied on the prior state of the law or whether any unfairness 
would result from a retroactive application in her particular case.  
Fairness and reliance are only important in that they are the reason for 
the presumption against retroactivity; unless Congress expressly re-
quires a retroactive application of the statute, the courts presume that 
Congress did not intend to act unfairly by applying a law retroactively 
to a class of people who acted before the new law took effect. 
The legal fiction that deportation following a criminal conviction is not pun-
ishment is difficult to reconcile with reality, especially in the context of this 
case.  Mr. Scheidemann entered this country at age twelve; he has lived here 
for thirty-six years; he has been married to an American citizen for twenty-four 
years; he has raised three children all of whom are American citizens; his eld-
erly parents are naturalized citizens; two of his four siblings are naturalized 
American citizens, and all four of them reside permanently in the United 
States; he has no ties to Colombia, the country to which he is to be deported; 
and he has fully served the sentence imposed upon him.  If deportation under 
such circumstances is not punishment, it is difficult to envision what is. 
Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1527 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin, J., concurring).   
 Others have argued that the Due Process Clause limits retroactive application of 
deportation laws.  See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and 
the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 160-61 (1998) (arguing that IIRIRA’s retro-
active deportation rules violate the Due Process Clause because they lack the necessary 
rationales to justify such harsh retroactive provisions). 
74 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 948 
(1997) (citing the Ex Post Facto Clause for support in a civil retroactivity case); Land-
graf, 511 U.S. at 266 (same). 
75 See, e.g., Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
Landgraf is the “principal authority” governing civil retroactivity cases). 
76 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 272-73 (suggesting that the stated rule is a means 
of interpreting statutes to “coincide with legislative and public expectations”). 
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It is helpful to understand the facts of Landgraf.  The case arose 
out of a sexual harassment and retaliation suit against Ms. Landgraf’s 
employer, USI Film Products.77  The district court found that she had 
been sexually harassed, but that the harassment was not sufficiently 
severe to justify her decision to quit.78  Therefore, her termination did 
not violate Title VII, and she was not eligible for equitable relief in the 
form of back pay.79  At the time of the district court decision, Title VII 
only authorized equitable relief, leading the trial court to dismiss her 
action despite its finding that she had been sexually harassed.80  How-
ever, while Landgraf’s appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 was signed into law.81  The new Civil Rights Act allowed plaintiffs 
who proved harassment to recover compensatory and punitive dam-
ages as well, and permitted any party to request a jury trial if damages 
were claimed.82  Based on this new provision, Landgraf argued on ap-
peal that her case should be remanded to the trial court for a jury trial 
on damages.83
The Supreme Court held, in an 8-1 decision,84 that applying the 
new damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct 
(the sexual harassment) that occurred before the effective date of the 
law, would be impermissibly retroactive, given that Congress did not 
explicitly state that the damages provision should be applied retroac-
tively.85
The Court reached this conclusion by applying a two-part test.86  
Step one asks “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s 
proper reach.”87  If Congress made the statute’s scope expressly retro-
active, then it must be applied retroactively, and there is “no need to 
77 Id. at 248. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 249, 252. 
80 Id. at 249. 
81 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
82 Id. § 102. 
83 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 249. 
84 Justice Blackmun dissented in the case.  Id. at 294 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
85 See id. at 286 (majority opinion) (“[W]e have found no clear evidence of con-
gressional intent that § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply to cases arising 
before its enactment . . . .”). 
86 Id. at 280.  This test has been accepted unanimously by the Court several times 
since Landgraf.  See, e.g., Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999) (applying Landgraf ’s 
two-step analysis); Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 
(1997) (holding that absent evidence of clear congressional intent, the statute will not 
have retroactive effect under the Landgraf analysis). 
87 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
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resort to judicial default rules.”88  If Congress did not make clear the 
temporal reach of the statute, then the court must determine 
“whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, that is, 
whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, in-
crease a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed.”89  If the statute would im-
pose new legal consequences on past acts, then the “traditional pre-
sumption” against retroactive application without “clear congressional 
intent” would prohibit the retroactive effect.90
The Landgraf test is, thus, one of statutory construction with a 
strong presumption against retroactivity, absent a statement by Con-
gress expressly prescribing the statute’s temporal reach.  A civil statute 
may be made retroactive by Congress if it so desires, because the Ex 
Post Facto Clause is not a bar in the civil context.91  However, absent a 
clear showing that the statute’s scope extends to past acts, the pre-
sumption against retroactivity will void any such application of the law.  
The courts’ role is to faithfully implement the law as written by Con-
gress, be it retroactive or prospective, and where the scope of the stat-
ute is unclear, a court may only permit prospective application, be-
cause of the strong disfavor for retroactive laws.92
The Landgraf two-part test is only concerned with statutory con-
struction (i.e., what is the scope of the statute and to which class does 
this statute apply?) rather than with considerations of fairness or reli-
ance by individual parties.  The Court’s decision in Landgraf did not 




91 See id. at 266 n.19 (noting the inapplicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to any-
thing other than “penal legislation”).  Presumably, the Due Process Clause would place 
some sort of limitation on the freedom Congress has to apply consequences retroac-
tively in the civil context.  See Morawetz, supra note 73, at 160-61 (suggesting that the 
Due Process Clause is an independent limit to retroactivity). 
92 The Court notes that its presumption against retroactivity in the civil context is 
soundly rooted in a “long line of cases” that “span two centuries,” including Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital, whose straightforward rule the Court cites approvingly:  
“[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have 
retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.”  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272 
(quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)).  The Court 
also notes that the jurisprudence that supports the antiretroactivity presumption has 
largely, but not exclusively, involved provisions “affecting contractual or property 
rights.”  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 271.  Indeed, the Court highlights an early Chinese im-
migration case, Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559 (1884), as an example of 
the presumption’s use outside the commercial context. 
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lar case.  The presumption against retroactivity means that once it is 
theoretically possible that the reliance interest of any member of a 
class could be upset by application of the statute (i.e., that there is a 
retroactive effect), then the statute is read to exclude every member of 
that class. 
“Fairness” is only a component of the analysis insofar as it is the 
basis for the presumption against retroactivity.93  Congress is permit-
ted to be “unfair” by crafting explicitly retroactive laws if it so decides; 
but if Congress does not clearly mandate retroactivity, the Court will 
presume the statute does not retroactively add legal consequences to 
past acts, because the Court presumes that Congress does not act in 
an unfair manner without explicitly saying it is doing so. 
Indeed, the Landgraf Court rightly noted that concerns about 
“lack of fair notice,” “suspect legislative purpose,” and “fairness” were 
“muted” on the particular facts of the case because sexual harassment 
was legally proscribed at the time the harassment occurred.94  Even 
though fairness to the employer, USI Film, was not a concern, a retro-
active effect was still not permissible.  Clearly then, the Court’s deci-
sion was not based on an individualized consideration of fairness. 
The same is true in the Supreme Court’s next important civil ret-
roactivity decision, Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. 
Schumer.95  In a unanimous decision, the Hughes Court fully adopted 
93 As the Landgraf Court stated: 
Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered 
the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an 
acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.  Such a requirement 
allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments con-
cerning the proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the additional virtue of 
giving legislators a predictable background rule against which to legislate. 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73.  The Court is equally clear when it notes that “[t]he pre-
sumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to 
the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact.”  Id. at 270. 
94  Id. at 282.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had already made sexual harassment 
unlawful; sexual harassment discrimination was already subject to monetary liability 
(back pay) under the 1964 version of the Act.  Id.  Further, compensatory damages do 
not “smack of a ‘retributive’ or other suspect legislative purpose” because they seek to 
make the victim whole.  Id.  Thus, the Court concluded that compensatory damages 
are “not in a category in which objections to retroactive application on grounds of 
fairness have their greatest force.”  Id.  Yet, despite this muted concern with fairness, 
the Court still found that application of the amended Act’s compensatory damages 
provision to conduct occurring before enactment of the statute was retroactive because 
it would “affect[] the liabilities of defendants,” would have “an impact on private par-
ties’ planning,” and would “attach an important new legal burden to that conduct.”  Id. 
at 282-83. 
95 520 U.S. 939 (1997).  In Hughes, the Court embraces Landgraf ’s presumption 
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the Landgraf framework.  Nowhere in the opinion does the Hughes 
Court discuss the defendant’s reliance on the new law, nor does it 
consider whether applying the later law to past conduct would be un-
fair to the defendant, Hughes.96  Instead, the Court finds an imper-
missible retroactive effect because applying the new law to past con-
duct would “attach[] a new disability,”97 “create a new cause of 
action,”98 and “deprive Hughes of [a] defense.”99  The Hughes Court 
used the same test for retroactive effect set out in Landgraf:  whether 
new legal consequences have been attached to past conduct.100
against retroactive legislation, calling it a “time-honored presumption” to be applied 
“unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to the contrary.”  Id. at 946.  The de-
cision is notable because it is unanimous, quite short, and absolutely embraces the 
crystal clear rules of statutory construction set out in Landgraf, a clarity that is lost in 
the lower court decisions on 212(c) retroactivity. 
96 A summary of the facts of Hughes follows.  In 1989, William J. Schumer filed a 
qui tam suit against Hughes Aircraft, under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C.  
§ 3730(b) (2000).  The FCA allowed private individuals to sue parties, on behalf of the 
government, for submitting false claims to the government.  Congress amended the 
FCA in 1986 to expand the opportunity to bring qui tam actions.  False Claims 
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153.  Prior to the 1986 
amendment, if the government possessed the information on which the claim was 
based, the government alone could file suit.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982).  After the 
1986 amendment, however, prior knowledge by the government no longer barred 
commencement of a qui tam claim unless the information had been “publicly dis-
closed” and the suit “was not brought by an original source of the information.”  
Hughes, 520 U.S. at 946.  Schumer sued under the 1986 amendment to the FCA.  The 
allegedly false claims were submitted by Hughes to the government between 1982 and 
1984, several years before passage of the 1986 amendment.  The Court undertook a 
Landgraf two-step analysis and determined that (1) there was no indication that Con-
gress intended the amended provision to apply retroactively, id., and (2) applying the 
amendment in this case would have an impermissible retroactive effect by removing a 
defense available to Hughes prior to the 1986 amendment, id. at 951-52.  Therefore, 
the Court held that the District Court should have dismissed Schumer’s qui tam suit 
because it was based on information the government possessed, which provided 
Hughes with a full defense under the 1982 version of the statute.  Id. at 952. 
97 Hughes, 520 U.S. at 948 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 951-52. 
100 See Hughes, 520 U.S. at 947 (affirming Landgraf as the controlling “formula-
tion[] to describe . . . [the] definition for presumptively impermissible retroactive leg-
islation”); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70 (“The court must ask whether the new 
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enact-
ment.”). 
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While Landgraf ’s test for retroactive effect is clear,101 some lower 
courts have introduced “reliance” as a component of the test for ret-
roactive effect in the immigration context.102  Lower courts have based 
this muddying of Landgraf ’s clear test on a misreading of one sentence 
of that opinion.  After stating the rule for determining retroactive ef-
fect, Landgraf notes the difficulty that courts may have in determining 
retroactive effect.103  Then, the Court offers guidance to lower courts, 
suggesting they should trust their instincts in making this determina-
tion.  The exact sentence, often misused by lower courts,104 reads as 
follows:  “However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to 
have ‘sound . . . instinct[s],’ and familiar considerations of fair notice, 
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.”105
Contrary to lower courts’ interpretation, the Court here has not 
set up an individualized, as-applied test for retroactive effect, but 
merely offers lower courts signposts for detecting when a retroactive 
effect as to an entire class has occurred.  If applying a new rule to a past 
act has the potential of operating in an unfair way as to members of a 
class (i.e., defendants who committed their act prior to the new law) 
then the statute creates a retroactive effect.  There is no requirement 
101 The Landgraf decision notes that the Court’s definition of retroactive effect has 
also remained consistent over time.  See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 (“Though the formu-
las have varied, similar functional conceptions of legislative ‘retroactivity’ have found 
voice in this Court’s decisions and elsewhere.”).  The Court cites several opinions to 
support this assertion, including Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 
756, 767 (No. 13,156) (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.N.H. 1814) (defining a retroactive 
statute as one that “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability”); Miller v. 
Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (“A law is retrospective if it ‘changes the legal conse-
quences of acts completed before its effective date.’” (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 
U.S. 24, 31 (1981))); and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 
190, 199 (1913) (noting that a retroactive statute gives “a quality or effect to acts or 
conduct which they did not have or did not contemplate when they were performed”).  
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268-69.  The Landgraf Court phrases the definition in this way:  a 
statute is retroactive if it “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase 
a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed.”  Id. at 280. 
102 See, e.g., Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (asking whether “the 
petitioners chose to go to trial in reliance on the availability of § 212(c) relief”). 
103 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270 (“Any test of retroactivity will leave room for dis-
agreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal 
changes with perfect philosophical clarity.”). 
104 See infra Part II.B (detailing the continued misapplication of the Landgraf deci-
sion by lower courts). 
105 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270 (citation omitted) (quoting Danforth v. Groton Water 
Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476 (1901)). 
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for an individual member of that class to prove that she would suffer 
an unfairness were the new law to be applied to her in particular. 
In the 212(c) context, some lower courts have held that the ille-
gality of the prior act is sufficient notice to preclude a later finding of 
retroactive effect.106  However, both Landgraf and Hughes make clear 
that this reasoning is incorrect.107  Actual notice that some behavior is 
proscribed and illegal, and so carries with it criminal and civil conse-
quences, is irrelevant to the question of whether the new law attaches 
new legal consequences to past acts.  Just because an act is proscribed 
does not mean that the penalty for that act can be increased retroac-
tively. 
The only dispositive test for retroactive effect under Landgraf and 
its progeny is not fairness or reliance by individual parties, but 
whether new legal consequences have been attached to the past con-
duct of a class of litigants.  The Landgraf rule is crystal clear; unfortu-
nately, the analysis by some lower courts on this issue in the 212(c) 
context, has been less so. 
3.  The Court’s Decision in St. Cyr 
The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in INS v. St. Cyr was a water-
shed event in immigration law because it reversed six years of incor-
rect application of Landgraf in the 212(c) context.108  The pre-St. Cyr 
interpretation of the law—by the Attorney General and many lower 
federal courts—was so out of line with the mandate of Landgraf that 
St. Cyr has been rightly termed an “easy case.”109  Unfortunately, the 
106 See e.g., Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1523 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In this case, 
the consequences of petitioner’s criminal conduct were clear at the time of that con-
duct and they remain unchanged today.  He was subject to possible criminal sanctions 
and deportation.”). 
107 See Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947-48 
(1997) (holding that the illegality of the act—submission of a false claim to the gov-
ernment—is not relevant to the question of whether a retroactive effect has occurred); 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283 n.35 (noting that even if conduct is “morally reprehensible or 
illegal,” the presumption against retroactivity still applies when the law “imposes addi-
tional burdens based on conduct that occurred in the past”). 
108 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001); see also Kanstroom, supra note 56 at 413 (“Indeed, if 
there were a Nobel Prize for against-the-odds litigation, there could be little doubt that 
it should go to those who labored so long and hard to get the Court—finally—to af-
firm a few propositions that many had thought fundamental . . . .”).
109 See Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 492-93 (3d Cir. 2004) (“On the whole, 
we think the Supreme Court regarded St. Cyr as a clear and straightforward result flow-
ing from Landgraf . . . .”).  The dissent in St. Cyr, written by Justice Scalia and joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice O’Connor (in part), focused ex-
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time lag in correcting this clear error had serious consequences for 
the many legal permanent residents who were deported prior to St. 
Cyr without the opportunity to apply for the waiver of deportation to 
which the Supreme Court later determined they were entitled. 
At its most basic, the portion of the St. Cyr decision devoted to ret-
roactivity held that Mr. St. Cyr, who pleaded guilty to his crime before 
repeal of 212(c) relief, was still entitled to apply for a waiver of depor-
tation.110  The St. Cyr decision begins by easily rejecting the two highly 
formalistic reasons given by the Justice Department and many lower 
courts for refusing to fully apply Landgraf to the immigration con-
text.111  First, the Court held that just because deportation proceed-
ings concern a future sanction does not mean that deportation cannot 
have a retroactive effect.112  Second, the Court quickly dispensed with 
clusively on the jurisdictional question and never reached the retroactivity issue, even 
in dicta.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Given Scalia’s insightful 
framing of retroactivity issues in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1998), and the forceful 
dissent by Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Thomas in support of the presumption 
against retroactivity in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 715-38 (2004), it 
would have been interesting to hear from the St. Cyr dissenters on the retroactivity is-
sue.  They might well have created a near unanimous decision on the retroactivity 
question. 
110 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-26 (2001) (finding, based on Landgraf, no 
basis for retroactive removal of petitioner’s access to 212(c) relief).  The facts of St. Cyr 
are as follows.  Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 1986, and pleaded guilty ten years later to a charge of 
selling a controlled substance, a violation of Connecticut law.  Id. at 293.  While this 
conviction made him subject to deportation, the AEDPA was not yet law at the time of 
his guilty plea, so he was eligible at the time of his plea to apply for 212(c) relief from 
deportation.  Id.  The INS began removal proceedings against St. Cyr on April 10, 
1997, by which time both AEDPA and IIRIRA had become law.  Id.  The government 
argued that under the new statutes the Attorney General no longer had authority to 
consider 212(c) relief for St. Cyr, because his crime was an “aggravated felony” under 
the terms of the new laws.  Id. at 297.  The decision also included a highly contentious 
threshold question, namely whether despite AEDPA and IIRIRA’s limits on habeas re-
view of final orders of removal, federal district courts retained jurisdiction to hear ha-
beas petitions.  Id. at 309.  The court held that it did.  Id. at 314. 
111 Id. at 324-25.  These two arguments were (1) that the power to grant relief 
from deportation is an inherently prospective exercise; and (2) that immigrants who 
previously could apply for 212(c) were not guaranteed to actually win relief from de-
portation, because the relief was discretionary only; hence, removal of the ability to 
apply for relief does not amount to the impairment of a right.  See In re Soriano, No. 
3289, 1997 WL 33347804 (Att’y Gen. Feb. 21, 1997) (reporting a decision by Attorney 
General Reno that reversed a BIA opinion holding that the repeal of 212(c) was not 
retroactive). 
112 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324 (holding that even though deportation is a prospec-
tive undertaking, rather than punishment for a past criminal act, it can still be carried 
out in a way that is retroactive as to that act).  The Court held in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984), that deportation is prospective in the sense that it de-
 
764 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 741 
 
the claim, made by Attorney General Reno and many lower courts, 
that removal of discretionary relief does not constitute impairment of 
a right:  “There is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity 
analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain de-
portation.”113
The St. Cyr decision is important in three respects:  (1) it man-
dates full application of the Landgraf framework to retroactivity ques-
tions in the immigration context; (2) like Landgraf and its progeny, it 
does not employ a subjective reliance test as part of step two of the 
analysis; and (3) it does not limit its decision to the facts of Mr. St. 
Cyr’s case, that is to the context of an accepted plea bargain.  Each is-
sue is considered in turn below. 
First, St. Cyr holds that the Court’s well-established retroactivity ju-
risprudence, embodied in Landgraf and its progeny, applies as fully in 
the immigration context as in any other.114  Applying step one of the 
Landgraf analysis, the Court concluded that Congress did not clearly 
mandate the temporal reach of IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) relief, and 
therefore the presumption against retroactivity meant the statute 
could not be applied in a way that caused a retroactive effect.115
Second, the Court does not employ an individualized assessment 
under step two of the Landgraf test.  To determine whether the statute 
would cause a retroactive effect, the Court employs the classic Land-
graf test:  whether the new law would attach new legal consequences to 
termines whether an immigrant will retain the right to remain in the United States, 
rather than punishing an immigrant for past bad acts.  However, the Court only held 
that deportation was prospective as a way of concluding that deportation is not subject 
to the procedural protections of the criminal system.  Id.; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324 
(“[W]e have [so held] in order to reject the argument that . . . deportation proceed-
ings are therefore subject to the ‘various protections that apply in the context of a 
criminal trial.’” (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038)). 
113 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325. 
114 See id. at 325 n.55 (asserting that just because Congress has the power to alter 
rights of permanent residents retroactively does not mean that the Court will not re-
quire Congress to “make its intention plain,” as Landgraf mandates); see also Ponnapula 
v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 491 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Court made plain in St. Cyr 
that the retroactive application of an immigration law is analyzed no differently from 
the retroactive application of any other civil statute.” (citation omitted)).  St. Cyr’s 
holding put to rest the persistent argument that because immigrants are here at the 
“grace” of the Attorney General, laws pertaining to them do not need to follow settled 
retroactivity principles. 
115 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (concluding that there was no evidence that Con-
gress had “affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application 
and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
244, 272-73 (1994))). 
 
2006] RETROACTIVITY AND IMMIGRANT CRIMES 765 
 
past conduct.116  The Court did not ask whether Mr. St. Cyr, as an in-
dividual, would suffer a retroactive effect, but whether the class of im-
migrants who pleaded guilty to their crimes prior to the repeal of 
212(c) could, hypothetically, suffer a retroactive effect.117
The Court makes this inquiry because if any member of the larger 
class runs a hypothetical risk of having her expectations upset, then 
applying the new law to the past conduct of any class members would 
amount to the attachment of new legal consequences to past acts.118  
This does not, however, mean that subjective individual reliance or ac-
tual class reliance is required.  Under St. Cyr, as under Landgraf, the 
only test for retroactive effect is whether new legal consequences 
would be attached to past acts.119  The Court concludes that because 
plea agreements involve a quid pro quo exchange between defendants 
and the government, it is hypothetically possible (and even probable) 
that an immigrant defendant in that situation would consider the im-
migration consequences of pleading guilty.120
116 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (explaining the second step of the analysis and citing 
to Landgraf for the standard). 
117 The Court asks whether a retroactive effect would be caused by applying the 
new to law to “aliens who, like respondent, were convicted pursuant to a plea agree-
ment at a time when their plea would not have rendered them ineligible for § 212(c) 
relief.”  Id. at 320.  The Third and Fourth Circuits have also recognized that St. Cyr es-
tablishes no subjective reliance test for a retroactive effect.  See Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 
F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that reliance (whether subjective or objec-
tive) is not a requirement of impermissible retroactivity . . . .”); Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 
493 (“And indeed the Court’s holding is not limited to those aliens who actually relied 
on the availability of § 212(c) relief . . . .”).  In fact, Enrico St. Cyr himself did not ne-
gotiate a plea deal that absolutely guaranteed he would be eligible for 212(c) relief 
under the pre-1996 law, because his deal imposed a ten-year sentence, with suspension 
of that sentence after five years.  See Brief for the Petitioner at 11 n.7, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289 (2001) (No. 00-767) (explaining the deal offered to Mr. St. Cyr).  As the Third Cir-
cuit noted, if Mr. St. Cyr had actually served the entire five year sentence, under the 
pre-1996 law he would have been ineligible to apply for deportation relief under 
212(c).  See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 493 n.11 (noting that the pre-1996 INA denied 
212(c) relief to immigrants who served a term of imprisonment of at least five years). 
118 As the Landgraf Court noted, “[t]he presumption against statutory retroactivity 
has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new bur-
dens on persons after the fact.”  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. 
119 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (repeating Landgraf ’s formulation and Justice Story’s 
definition of retroactivity). 
120 The Court notes the following: 
Now that prosecutors have received the benefit of these plea agreements, 
agreements that were likely facilitated by the aliens’ belief in their continued 
eligibility for § 212(c) relief, it would surely be contrary to “familiar considera-
tions of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations” to hold that 
IIRIRA’s subsequent restrictions deprive them of any possibility of such relief. 
Id. at 323-24 (citation omitted) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270).  Note that the 
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Third, the St. Cyr decision does not limit its holding to the facts of 
the case, that is, to the context of an accepted plea bargain.  The deci-
sion does discuss the specific reasons that the class of immigrants who 
accepted a plea deal could have hypothetically relied on the availabil-
ity of 212(c) relief, thereby creating an impermissible retroactive ef-
fect.121  But it does not say that no other class of immigrant could hy-
pothetically have so relied.122  This is important because many post-St. 
Cyr lower courts have confined St. Cyr to the plea bargain context.123  
Lower courts have used this flawed understanding of St. Cyr’s rule to 
reject retroactivity arguments made by other classes of immigrants 
without engaging in the required Landgraf two-step analysis.124  This 
violates St. Cyr’s pronouncement that the Landgraf two-step analysis 
should be fully applied to immigration claims. 
In summary, the flawed analysis that plagued 212(c) jurispru-
dence from Soriano until St. Cyr was based on the notion that immigra-
tion was somehow excused from normal retroactivity considerations.  
St. Cyr’s major contribution was to correct this misperception.  How-
Court here speaks only about a hypothetical immigrant within the class of immigrants 
who pleaded guilty to their crimes prior to repeal of 212(c) relief. 
121 Id. 
122 See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 493 (“The holding in St. Cyr then is simply not sub-
ject to a qualification that the alien seeking the opportunity to pursue § 212(c) relief 
must have accepted a plea agreement that necessarily preserved his eligibility for § 
212(c) relief . . . .”). 
123 See infra Part II.B (describing lower courts’ misapplication of St. Cyr). 
124 Courts have so held as to immigrants who turned down a plea agreement and 
proceeded to trial, and immigrants who committed their crimes prior to the repeal of 
212(c).  See, e.g., Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004) (per cu-
riam) (denying the defendant 212(c) relief and holding that St. Cyr does not apply to 
defendants who elect to go to trial); Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 99-100 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“The claim that they relied on § 212(c) relief . . . is somewhat hollow; in fact, 
they decided to go to trial to challenge the underlying crime that could render them 
deportable and, had they succeeded, § 212(c) relief would be irrelevant.”); Dias v. INS, 
311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (refusing § 212(c) relief because the 
petitioner, in going to trial, allegedly did not rely on the state of the law prior to 
AEDPA); Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The key event in 
terms of St. Cyr’s analysis of whether the new statute would produce a retroactive effect 
was the alien’s decision to abandon his constitutional right to a trial . . . .”); Armen-
dariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an alien’s 
claim to § 212(c) relief because he elected a jury trial); Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 
1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2002) (postulating that an immigrant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights were not violated when he elected a jury trial, was convicted, and subsequently 
was not granted § 212(c) relief).  Of these cases, those from the Second and Fourth 
Circuits held that non-plea convictions did not have a retroactive effect because they 
lacked the quid pro quo of a plea bargain; the other cases limited St. Cyr to the plea 
bargain context without specifically saying that St. Cyr requires a quid pro quo for a 
finding of retroactive effect. 
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ever, post-St. Cyr, many lower courts continue to insist that immigra-
tion cases need not conform to the Supreme Court’s clear retroactivity 
jurisprudence. 
B.  Post-St. Cyr:  Lower Courts Continue to Misapply Landgraf 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Rankine v. Reno is representative 
of many lower courts’ failure to fully apply Landgraf ’s two-part test in 
the immigration context.125  That case resolved appeals by three per-
manent residents, two from Jamaica and one from Nigeria.126  All 
three committed their crimes and were convicted at jury trials before 
enactment of IIRIRA.127  The Rankine court adopted a faulty frame-
work to decide whether an impermissible retroactive effect would oc-
cur by asking whether “the petitioners chose to go to trial in reliance on 
the availability of § 212(c) relief.”128  This test improperly inquires into 
the subjective behavior of the parties rather than addressing whether 
the law would theoretically attach new legal consequences to the past 
acts of the class, as required by Landgraf.  The second error in Rankine 
is that the court confined St. Cyr to its facts, namely the accepted plea 
bargain context, by distinguishing the acceptance of a plea bargain 
from the decision to go to trial.129
Third, the Rankine decision improperly shifts the burden of proof 
by turning the presumption against retroactivity into a protection that 
must be earned by the party that invokes it.  Instead of the presump-
tion governing the scope of the statute as to an entire class of immi-
125 319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003). 
126 Id. at 96-97. 
127 Id. at 97. 
128 Id. at 100 (emphasis added).  At various points in the decision, the court claims 
that a finding of retroactive effect requires that the immigrant’s conduct indicate “reli-
ance,” id. at 100; that she “detrimentally changed [her] position in reliance on contin-
ued eligibility for § 212(c) relief,” id. at 99; that she can point to conduct “that reflects 
an intention to preserve [her] eligibility for relief under § 212(c),” id. at 100; that she 
engaged in some act that “gave rise to [a] reliance interest,” id.; that she can “plausibly 
claim that [she] would have acted . . . differently if [she] had known about [the legal 
change],” id. at 102 (quoting Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 
(9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)); and that she can show “detrimen-
tal reliance on § 212(c) by . . . [choosing] to go to trial,” id. 
129 The Rankine court held that “the choice to go to trial put[s] [the] petitioners 
on different footing [from an immigrant who accepts a plea bargain like Mr. St. Cyr] 
in two crucial respects,” namely:  (1) unlike St. Cyr, they did not “detrimentally 
change[ ] [their] position in reliance on continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief”; and 
(2) they “pointed to no conduct” that reflected “an intention to preserve their eligibil-
ity” for 212(c) relief.  Rankine, 319 F.3d at 99-100. 
 
768 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 741 
 
grants, as Landgraf requires, the Rankine court asked whether one par-
ticular member of that class has earned the right to be protected by 
the presumption.130  The “timeless and universal human appeal”131 of 
the antiretroactivity presumption is that it protects the people from 
government overreaching, honors a basic understanding about how 
the law works, protects groups from unfair targeting, and provides 
predictability.132  The purpose of the presumption is to protect classes 
of people from unfairness, a goal that would be undermined by re-
quiring that individuals within that class do something to earn the 
right to be protected. 
C.  Can Ponnapula and Olatunji Save Retroactivity Analysis  
in the Immigration Context? 
Two recent circuit court decisions may mark a return of 212(c) 
decisions to the Landgraf framework.  Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, decided 
June 28, 2004, by a unanimous panel in the Third Circuit, held that 
an immigrant who turned down a plea agreement and proceeded to 
trial before the enactment of IIRIRA was entitled to apply for 212(c) 
relief.133  On October 19, 2004, the Fourth Circuit concluded in Ola-
tunji v. Ashcroft that “reliance is not a requirement of impermissible 
retroactivity.”134  The Fourth Circuit decision, though it addressed a 
130 Indeed, the opinion does not once use the word “presumption” even though 
the presumption against retroactivity is at the very heart of this analysis.  See Ponnapula 
v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 489 n.6 (3d. Cir. 2004) (noting that the word “presumption” 
is used only one time in Rankine, and that it only appears incidentally “in an extended 
quotation of another Court of Appeals’ decision”). 
131 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the 
longstanding principle that conduct should be adjudicated under the laws in effect at 
the time of the conduct). 
132 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (noting the policy concerns that 
animate the opposition to retroactive laws). 
133 373 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Here, with respect to an alien who reasona-
bly could have relied on the potential availability of § 212(c) relief, application of the 
Landgraf principles shows that IIRIRA section 304(b) has an impermissible retroactive 
effect.”). 
134 387 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2004).  The Olatunji decision involved a non-212(c) 
case arising under IIRIRA.  Prior to IIRIRA, permanent residents who traveled abroad 
for “innocent, casual, and brief” trips were not considered, upon their return, to be 
applying for “entry” into the United States.  See id. at 395 (quoting Rosenburg v. Fleuti, 
374 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1963) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13))).  IIRIRA replaced 
the term “entry” with “admission” and applied IIRIRA to residents convicted of aggra-
vated felonies who applied for “admission” when returning from brief trips abroad.  See 
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §301(a), 110 Stat. 546, 575 (1996) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)) (defining “admission” to include permanent residents who 
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different provision of IIRIRA, is remarkable for its spot-on treatment 
of the reliance question. 
1.  The Third Circuit’s Decision:  Ponnapula 
The Third Circuit decision in Ponnapula offers an excellent rebut-
tal to the flawed post-St. Cyr thinking epitomized by the Rankine deci-
sion.  The decision does three important things:  (1) it takes statutory 
construction and the presumption against retroactivity as its starting 
point; (2) it challenges the Rankine claim that actual reliance is a pre-
requisite for applying the presumption against retroactivity in an indi-
vidual case; and (3) it does not confine St. Cyr to the context of an ac-
cepted plea bargain. 
Ponnapula involves a permanent resident who was a relatively mi-
nor (and perhaps completely unwitting) participant in a fraudulent 
loan application scheme.135  At the time of his trial he was offered a 
misdemeanor plea deal, but rejected it with the hope of being acquit-
ted at trial, and also with the knowledge that 212(c) would be avail-
able to him should he be convicted.136  After his conviction, IIRIRA 
was enacted, which the government argued made him automatically 
deportable. 
The Ponnapula court begins its analysis where Landgraf says it 
should, with statutory construction.137  Because Congress did not ex-
pressly mandate a retroactive repeal of 212(c), the court correctly 
notes that Landgraf established a “presumption against statutory retro-
activity.”138  This starting point is a significant improvement over 
Rankine, which failed to even mention the existence of this presump-
tion.139
commit crimes of moral turpitude or drug offenses, travel abroad, and seek to return).  
When Mr. Olatunji returned from a nine-day trip to London, he disclosed his pre-
IIRIRA conviction, and the government deemed him an alien seeking admission under 
IIRIRA, which subjected him to removal proceedings.  See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 386 (de-
tailing the procedural aspects of Olatunji’s case). 
135 See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 485 (noting the trial judge’s finding that “peti-
tioner’s counsel has convinced me that his client was, for lack of a better term, the 
small fry or—maybe even better term—the schnook of this particular group of miscre-
ants”). 
136 Id. at 484. 
137 See id. at 490 (“[I]n the absence of a clear command, a consistent line of cases 
establishes that ‘congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be con-
strued to have retroactive effect.’” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 
272 (1994))). 
138 Id. at 482 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). 
139 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that Rankine does not discuss 
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Second, after noting that the correct test under step two of Land-
graf is to ask whether the new law “attaches new legal consequences to 
prior events,”140 Ponnapula challenges Rankine’s claim that the test for 
retroactive effect also requires proof of actual reliance.141  Reviewing 
the facts and holdings of Landgraf, Hughes, Martin, and St. Cyr, the 
court concludes that none of these cases require actual reliance by the 
party in order to benefit from the presumption against retroactivity.  
Ponnapula rightly criticizes Rankine for its “subtle heightening of the 
showing required to trigger the presumption against retroactivity.”142
That said, Ponnapula does not reject reliance completely.  Rather, 
the court concludes, based largely on Martin and St. Cyr, that the Su-
preme Court has adopted a “reasonable reliance” requirement as to 
the group or class of people “to whose conduct the statute is ad-
dressed.”143  But, arguably, the distinction between requiring reason-
able reliance and requiring no reliance at all is meaningless.  The 
Fourth Circuit in Olatunji makes this argument quite convincingly: 
[W]e must admit that it is unclear to us in what circumstance, if any, the 
“reasonable reliance” inquiry will (or at least should) yield a conclusion 
different from that reached under Justice Story’s framework.  For it 
would seem never to be unreasonable for one to rely upon a duly en-
acted or promulgated law.
144
While Ponnapula correctly rejects Rankine’s requirement of actual 
reliance, the court muddies that clear conclusion by discussing Mr. 
Ponnapula’s “reasonable reliance.”145  Because it is always reasonable 
the presumption). 
140 Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 482-83. 
141 Ponnapula correctly questions Rankine’s focus on “the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the party before the court.”  Id. at 491.  “[T]he Second Circuit seems to 
require a quantum of evidence regarding the subjective intent of the party seeking to 
avoid retroactive application; this too strikes us as being in tension with the language 
of presumption in Landgraf and its progeny . . . .”  Id. 
142 Id. at 491. 
143 Id. at 493. 
144 Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383, 396 (4th Cir. 2004). 
145 For example, the Ponnapula court correctly emphasizes that the Supreme Court 
decided Landgraf and Hughes without reference to reliance by the parties or even the 
class: 
[I]t is unlikely that in Landgraf any employer demonstrably relied on the ab-
sence of a punitive damages remedy for Title VII violations, or that in Hughes 
Aircraft any government contractor purposely arranged its billing practices ex 
ante to take advantage of a specific defense under the False Claims Act. 
Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 493.  Yet, having found that reliance was not a factor in either of 
these cases, the court nonetheless evaluates Mr. Ponnapula’s situation in terms of his 
reliance.  For example, the court says: 
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to rely on the current state of the law, “reasonable reliance,” can really 
only mean that a court applies the law as it existed at the time of the 
act.  Thus, Ponnapula’s holding is an affirmation of Landgraf ’s lack of a 
reliance requirement and a rejection of Rankine.  But this clarity is 
undermined by the reliance language that the court uses.  The Pon-
napula analysis would be clearer if the language of “reasonable reli-
ance” were substituted with a holding that no reliance at all is re-
quired to show retroactive effect.146  This is the conclusion that 
Olatunji reaches.147
Third, Ponnapula does not limit St. Cyr to the accepted plea bar-
gain context.  The decision correctly notes that St. Cyr should only be 
limited to its facts if St. Cyr “articulated the exclusive conditions for 
impermissible retroactivity in this context.”148  Ponnapula concludes 
that this is not so:  “St. Cyr is simply one application of the general 
principles articulated in Landgraf that counsel against interpreting 
statutes to have retroactive effect.”149  Because St. Cyr gives one exam-
ple of the way IIRIRA can attach new legal consequences to past acts, 
rather than giving the only way, the Ponnapula court is able to find an 
impermissible retroactive effect in a non-plea-bargain context. 
This case may seem harder [than Landgraf and its progeny] because making 
the decision to go to trial is perhaps more complex and more nuanced, but 
we should not let that obscure the fact that former § 212(c) was one of a host 
of factors considered by aliens who elected that course . . . . 
Id. at 495. 
146 One of the problems created by Ponnapula’s use of the empty phrase “reason-
able reliance” is that it sounds as though the court’s no-reliance holding is limited by a 
reasonable reliance standard, when it really is not (because “reasonable reliance” can 
only mean reliance on the state of the law at the time of the conduct, which is the same 
as a no-reliance standard).  The confusion created by this muddying manifests itself in 
the court’s statement that it “highly doubt[s]” that immigrants who “went to trial be-
cause they were not offered a plea agreement” have a “reliance interest that renders 
IIRIRA’s repeal of former § 212(c) impermissibly retroactive as to them.”  Id. at 494.  
By suggesting that the court’s holding does not apply to immigrants who were not of-
fered a plea agreement because they lack a reliance interest, the court implies that its 
holding requires a showing of reliance, even though it arguably holds just the opposite 
of that. 
147 See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 394 (“In sum, the historical presumption against retro-
active application of statutes did not require reliance.  Neither Landgraf nor subse-
quent Supreme Court authority imposes any such requirement.”). 
148 Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 488. 
149 Id. at 483. 
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2.  The Fourth Circuit’s Decision:  Olatunji 
The Fourth Circuit’s treatment of reliance in Olatunji v. Ashcroft 
provides an antidote to the confusion surrounding reliance in retroac-
tivity analysis.150  The decision cuts through the chaff of previous deci-
sions by flatly stating that reliance is not required for a finding of im-
permissible retroactive effect.151  The decision represents a fulfillment 
of one of St. Cyr’s most important pronouncements—that retroactivity 
analysis is applied the same way in the immigration context as it is in 
any other area of civil law.152
The Olatunji case concerned a parallel IIRIRA provision that 
changed the rule for when permanent residents with criminal convic-
tions were deemed admissible to the United States after returning 
from brief trips abroad.153  The respondent in the case, having 
pleaded guilty years earlier to one count of theft, was denied admis-
sion into the U.S. after a nine-day trip abroad, based on IIRIRA’s re-
definition of admissibility.154  The issue in the case was one of retroac-
tivity:  was an impermissible retroactive effect created by attaching new 
legal consequences (deportation) to a prior act (his crime and guilty 
plea)? 
The Olatunji decision correctly calls cases like Rankine “nothing 
but judicial legislation,” because they permit the retroactive applica-
tion of a statute even though Congress did not mandate such retroac-
tivity.155  Instead of adopting Rankine’s flawed reasoning, Olatunji be-
150 387 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2004). 
151 Id. at 388. 
152 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that St. Cyr rejected 
lower court decisions holding that retroactivity analysis functioned differently in the 
immigration context). 
153 See supra note 134 and accompanying text for further explanation of the legal 
provisions at issue in Olatunji. 
154 The basic facts of Olatunji are as follows:  Clifford K. Olatunji, a citizen of Nige-
ria, pleaded guilty in 1994 (pre-IIRIRA) to one count of theft of government property 
and was sentenced to two months at a community treatment center, a $259 fine, a 
$2,296 payment of restitution, and probation for two years.  In 1998, after the enact-
ment of IIRIRA, Mr. Olatunji took a nine-day trip to London.  When he returned to 
the United States, he disclosed his conviction, which led the INS to classify him, ac-
cording to IIRIRA, as a permanent resident seeking admission to the United States.  
Due to his conviction, he was deemed inadmissible under IIRIRA and was ordered de-
ported.  Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 386. 
155 See id. at 394 (“[W]here Congress has apparently given no thought to . . . retro-
activity whatever, there is no basis for inferring that Congress’ intent was any more nu-
anced than that statutes should not be held to apply retroactively.  Anything more, in 
the face of complete congressional silence, is nothing but judicial legislation.”). 
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gins its analysis with the retroactivity framework of Landgraf, namely 
statutory construction and the presumption against retroactivity.156
Directly rebutting the Rankine line of cases, Olatunji holds that “re-
liance (whether subjective or objective) is not a requirement of im-
permissible retroactivity.”157  At most, the court says a “reasonable reli-
ance” standard—à la Ponnapula—may be required;158 however, the 
Olatunji court views that as an empty requirement, given that it is al-
ways reasonable to rely on a “duly promulgated” law.159  The court 
notes that the Supreme Court’s treatment of reliance has been “con-
fusing . . . beginning in Landgraf and continuing through St. Cyr.”160  
But after reviewing those cases,161 the court concludes that none estab-
lished an actual reliance requirement.162
Requiring reliance, the Olatunji court argues, would not be in 
keeping with the logic of the presumption against retroactivity:  
156 See id. at 389 (“Retroactivity is a question of congressional intent.”). 
157 Id. at 388. 
158 See id. at 389 (“If some form of reliance were understood as required by the Su-
preme Court’s teachings on the subject, it could only be objectively reasonable reli-
ance.”). 
159 See id. at 396 (“For it would seem never to be unreasonable for one to rely upon 
a duly enacted as promulgated law.”). 
160 Id. at 389.  Olatunji also calls Landgraf ’s treatment of reliance “ambiguous.”  Id. 
at 390.  This may be a bit of a false characterization, because the Landgraf Court forth-
rightly stated that fairness and reliance were not the basis for its decision.  The Court 
found an impermissible retroactive effect because the compensatory damages “at-
tach[ed] an important new legal burden to [the past] conduct,” even though concerns 
about fairness and reliance were “muted.”  Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 
283 (1994).  Therefore, Landgraf cannot be read to require any showing of reliance.  
The ambiguity of the Landgraf decision that the Olatunji court laments has been cre-
ated by later interpretations of the decision, and particularly a misinterpretation of the 
“familiar considerations” phrase.  See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (argu-
ing that the circuit courts have rendered Landgraf’s holding ambiguous by misreading 
one sentence of the Court’s opinion). 
161 The Olatunji court’s review of cases included Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 
U.S. 677 (2004); Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2004); Rankine v. Reno, 
319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003); Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002); INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Velasquez-Gabriel v. Crocetti, 263 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 2001); Ta-
sios v. Reno, 204 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2000); Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1998); Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997); and Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 
244.  Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 390-94. 
162 See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 394 (“In sum, the historical presumption against retro-
active application of statutes did not require reliance.  Neither Landgraf nor subse-
quent Supreme Court authority imposes any such requirement.  And we believe that 
the consideration of reliance is irrelevant to statutory retroactivity analysis.”).  The 
Ponnapula decision came to this same conclusion.  See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 489 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never required actual reliance in any case in the Landgraf 
line.”). 
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“[S]ubjective reliance . . . is neither dictated by Supreme Court prece-
dent nor related to the presumption of congressional intent underly-
ing the bar against retroactivity.”163  As Olatunji noted, retroactivity 
analysis is based on a statutory construction inquiry into the pre-
scribed scope of the statute; once the scope is determined as to a class, 
the subjective behaviors of individual members of that class do not 
matter: 
It is one thing to indulge in the supportable presumption that Congress 
intends its enactments not to operate retroactively; it is another alto-
gether to indulge the quite different, and unsupported and unsupport-
able, presumption that Congress so intends, but only where the particu-
lar petitioning party can prove that he subjectively relied on the prior 
statement to his detriment.
164
Olatunji highlights the way in which Landgraf and retroactivity 
analysis generally are based on the notion of a separation of powers.  
Congress, not the courts, is the proper body to determine what is fair 
and unfair in terms of civil retroactivity, and whether unfairness is a 
worthy price to pay in order to accomplish other policy goals.165  If 
Congress has not mandated retroactive application, the courts cannot 
invade Congress’ territory by judicially legislating a potentially unfair 
result.  Only Congress can make that choice.  Therefore, litigants, 
commentators, and courts confronted with civil retroactivity questions 
should focus on Landgraf ’s two-part test of statutory construction, 
rather than the legally irrelevant issues of individual fairness and no-
tice.166  Unfairness arguments should be made to Congress, not the 
163 Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 389. 
164 Id. at 394. 
165 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (looking first to Congress for determination of 
policy). 
166 For example, Mr. Ponnapula’s story is incredibly sympathetic—he was a “small 
fry” in the criminal endeavor, taken advantage of by his brother; his crime was filing a 
false loan application; he had lived in the U.S. for many years and had a wife and chil-
dren who were U.S. citizens; and he was at the very final stages of becoming a U.S. citi-
zen, with just the oath left to be administered, when he was indicted.  Ponnapula, 373 
F.3d at 483-86.  But suppose that none of that were true, and Mr. Ponnapula were ac-
tually an unsavory character who committed a violent crime.  If he had turned down a 
plea deal, proceeded to trial, and received a sentence of less than five years he would 
still be eligible for 212(c) relief under the Olatunji holding and protected from retro-
active application of IIRIRA, not because he deserved any special considerations be-
cause he was a good person, or because taking away 212(c) relief seemed “unfair,” but 
simply because IIRIRA would attach new legal consequences to his previous act of re-
jecting the plea and proceeding to trial. 
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courts, in this area of the law.  Once Congress decides the temporal 
scope of a civil statute, the Courts must faithfully apply it.167
III.   THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME IS THE RELEVANT ACT FOR 
DETERMINING THE RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF 212(C)’S REPEAL 
Given the Supreme Court’s retroactivity framework, the commis-
sion of the crime should be the relevant act for considering whether 
application of IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) is retroactive.  Under such an 
analysis, if an immigrant committed her crime prior to passage of 
IIRIRA, she would still have access to 212(c) relief; if she committed 
the crime after IIRIRA’s passage, she would not be eligible to apply for 
a waiver.  To date, no circuit court has reached this conclusion. 
In evaluating the question of whether the commission of the 
crime is the relevant past act for retroactivity purposes, no circuit 
court has rigorously applied the Supreme Court’s retroactivity frame-
work.  Instead, the courts have rejected the argument out of hand by 
citing unsupported dicta from a Seventh Circuit decision that was is-
sued prior to St. Cyr.168  This refusal to seriously examine the require-
ments of Landgraf and its progeny shows a continued reluctance to 
follow St. Cyr’s command to apply retroactivity analysis uniformly 
across all areas of law, including the immigration context. 
A.  The Circuit Courts Have Wrongly Rejected the  
Commission-of-the-Crime Argument 
The circuit courts have rejected the argument that the commis-
sion of the crime is the relevant act for determining retroactive effect 
on two grounds.  First, courts have said that the conviction, not the 
underlying commission of the crime, is what renders the immigrant 
ineligible for 212(c) relief under IIRIRA.169  Therefore, the convic-
167 The courts are, however, constrained at the margins by the Due Process Clause.  
See Morawetz, supra note 73, at 106 (suggesting that the Due Process Clause might ren-
der retroactive application of IIRIRA unconstitutional). 
168 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (arguing that courts have con-
fused Landsgraf’s clear test by misreading one sentence in the opinion as authorizing 
reliance as a component of the test for retroactivity). 
169 See Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the conviction, 
not the underlying criminal act, that triggers the disqualification from § 212(c) relief.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 
2000))). 
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tion, not the commission of the crime is the relevant act for retroactiv-
ity purposes.170
The second argument, actually more of a bald assertion offered 
with little explanation or support, is that criminals do not consider the 
immigration consequences of their crimes at the time of commission; 
therefore, the commission of the crime is not the proper point for 
retroactivity analysis.  The most widely quoted version of this assertion 
comes from dicta in LaGuerre v. Reno,171 a pre-St. Cyr case from the Sev-
enth Circuit.  Judge Posner wrote for the court: 
It would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have de-
cided not to commit drug crimes, or might have resisted conviction 
more vigorously, had they known that if they were not only imprisoned 
but also, when their prison term ended, ordered deported, they could 
not ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation.
172
Despite the fact that this dicta goes unexplained in LaGuerre, the 
statement has proven attractive to numerous courts.173  Decisions cit-
ing to LaGuerre’s dicta as a shorthand way of rejecting a commission-
170 Judge Gleeson, a district court judge in the Second Circuit, vehemently dis-
agreed with the logic of Domond, though he conceded he was required to follow the 
precedent: 
I suggest that common sense requires a different point of reference for the 
retroactivity analysis.  Few people would disagree with [petitioner’s] assertion 
that he has been ordered deported because he committed a property crime, 
not because he was convicted of it a year later.  The new laws regarding depor-
tation were intended to affect aliens who commit crimes, not judges or juries 
who pronounce them guilty. 
Mohammed v. Reno, 205 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
171 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998).  LaGuerre ultimately held, by a unanimous three-
judge panel, that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas 
claim due to the jurisdiction-limiting restrictions imposed by AEPDA.  See id. at 1040 
(“We conclude that for the class of aliens encompassed by section 440(a), judicial re-
view by means of habeas corpus did not survive the enactment of that section.”).  This 
holding, of course, was reversed when the Supreme Court decided St. Cyr four years 
later.  Even though LaGuerre was overturned by the Supreme Court in St. Cyr and was 
written before St. Cyr confirmed that full Landgraf retroactivity analysis should be ap-
plied to immigration cases, lower courts continue to quote LaGuerre’s dicta about the 
commission-of-the-crime argument.  This alone is troubling. 
172 Id. at 1041. 
173 See, e.g., Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 102 n.12 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 
LaGuerre dicta); Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Lara-Ruiz v. 
INS, 241 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 
2000) (same); James v. Riley, 329 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (same).  But see Mo-
hammed v. Reno, 205 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the dicta); 
Zgombic v. Farquharson, 89 F. Supp. 2d 220, 232, n.10 (D. Conn. 2000) (same), rev’d, 
69 F. App’x 2 (2d Cir. 2003); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(same). 
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of-the-crime claim usually fail to add any analytical meat to these very 
weak bones.174
There are two fundamental problems with the Seventh Circuit’s 
“absurdity” rationale.  First, given the Supreme Court’s acceptance in 
Landgraf that businesses undertake cost-benefit analyses regarding 
their legal obligations,175 it is not absurd to imagine that immigrants 
might undertake a similar cost-benefit analysis before committing 
their own crimes. 
Second, even if it is absurd that an immigrant would consider the 
immigration consequences of her criminal acts, the court is asking the 
wrong question.  The issue for retroactivity analysis is not reliance on 
the state of the law at the time of the act, but whether the new law at-
taches new legal consequences to a past act.  An immigrant’s subjec-
tive consideration of the immigration consequences of her actions is 
not part of the retroactivity analysis—the immigrant does not have to 
prove she deserves the antiretroactivity presumption.  It is therefore 
immaterial whether a subjective consideration is absurd or not. 
Surprisingly, the LaGuerre dictum is embraced by the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Ponnapula, even though Ponnapula rejects an actual 
174 For example, Lara-Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 945, dismisses the argument in half a para-
graph, by citing LaGuerre’s dicta and scoffing that the applicant cannot “seriously main-
tain” that IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) “would upset his settled expectations sufficiently to 
trigger the presumption against retroactivity.”  The Lara-Ruiz court (1) relies solely on 
LaGuerre’s dicta to reject the commission-of-crime argument, and (2) requires the im-
migrant to prove she deserves protection from the presumption against retroactivity, by 
proving that her expectations have been sufficiently upset to “trigger” protection of 
the presumption.  The court is analytically superficial on the first count, and wrong on 
the second. 
 The Second Circuit offers only slightly more analysis in Mohammed v. Reno, 309 
F.3d at 102, and relies on the LaGuerre “absurd” dicta as the basis for rejecting the 
claim.  The court wraps the language of reliance around its conclusion of absurdity, 
which brings the decision into direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s lack of a reli-
ance requirement.  See id. at 103 (“Mohammed, who was convicted after section 212(c) 
relief became unavailable, has no basis for claiming similar reliance.”).  Reliance is the 
wrong test for retroactivity, and even if it were the right test, it would hardly be absurd 
for an immigrant to be concerned about the immigration consequences of her actions.  
It was not absurd for USI Film, in Landgraf, to be concerned about the damages conse-
quences of sexual harassment suits; and it was not absurd for Hughes Aircraft to be 
concerned about the mechanisms in place that might allow a private individual to sue 
the company for filing false claims.  It seems no more absurd for an immigrant to be 
concerned about the immigration consequences of her contemplated crime. 
175 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 283 n.35 (1994) (“The new dam-
ages provisions of § 102 can be expected to give managers an added incentive to take 
preventive measures to ward off discriminatory conduct by subordinates before it oc-
curs . . . .”). 
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reliance requirement.176  Ponnapula justifies its acceptance of LaGuerre 
by attempting to draw a distinction between an “attenuated reliance 
interest” like the one it finds in Landgraf and Hughes (i.e., it was 
unlikely that USI Film Products would be faced with a sexual harass-
ment suit or that Hughes Aircraft would be faced with a false claims 
suit) and an attenuation “connoting causal remoteness,” which the 
court finds in the case of an immigrant.177  This attempt to distinguish 
the two cases is unconvincing.  In each, the defendant is only vaguely 
aware of the potential consequences of its actions:  USI Film did not 
know what kind of damages it faced if it were to commit sexual har-
assment; Hughes Aircraft was not aware of who could bring qui tam 
suits against it; and the immigrant might not be aware of exactly which 
crimes she can commit without risking the loss of a waiver of deporta-
tion.  In addition, while many who commit crimes are aware that they 
will face legal and immigration consequences, it is also possible—as in 
Ponnapula—that they are such “small fries” in the operation that they 
are completely unaware that they will face criminal prosecution.  This 
lack of awareness does not mean that retroactive consequences should 
be heaped upon such a person.  Finally, Ponnapula’s attempt to distin-
guish between different types of reliance contradicts that decision’s 
core logic:  that reliance is not a requirement for protection from ret-
roactive laws. 
B.  Which Past Act Is Relevant for Retroactivity Analysis? 
Step two of Landgraf asks whether new legal consequences would 
be attached to past acts.  But which past acts are relevant for this ret-
roactive effect analysis?  Or, as Justice Scalia put the question in his 
concurrence in Martin v. Hadix, “retroactive in reference to what?”178
Both Landgraf and Hughes easily identify the relevant past act as 
the defendant’s commission of the illegal action, rather than the de-
fendant’s conviction.  And both cases state that the illegality of the 
past act—and the fact that the defendant was thereby on constructive 
notice not to commit such an act—is irrelevant to the decision of 
which act should be chosen.  In the context of 212(c), however, the 
holdings of Landgraf and Hughes have not been followed.  Lower court 
decisions like Lara-Ruiz and Mohammed have held that an immigrant’s 
176 See Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 495, 496 n.14 (quoting the LaGuerre 
claim of absurdity to reject the commission-of-the-crime argument). 
177 Id. at 496 n.14. 
178 527 U.S. 343, 362 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
2006] RETROACTIVITY AND IMMIGRANT CRIMES 779 
 
conviction is the relevant point of consideration because it is the con-
viction that makes the immigrant subject to deportation.179
In Landgraf, the Court could have chosen one of two acts as the 
“relevant conduct” for the retroactive effect test:  either the commis-
sion of sexual harrassment against Ms. Landgraf or the trial court’s 
finding that USI Film was guilty of committing sexual harassment 
(Point A or B of Figure 1).  The Court chose Point A, asking whether 
the new damages provisions would attach new legal consequences to 
the commission of sexual harassment.180  The Court did not choose 
Point B, which would require asking whether new legal consequences 
would be attached to the court’s finding that USI Film violated the 
law.  One might defend the choice of Point B because USI Film was 
not liable for damages until after an adjudication that the company 
was legally responsible for the sexual harassment; but the Court does 
not even consider this possibility.181  By not explaining why it chose A 
over B, the Court leaves the impression that the harassment was so ob-
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179 See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing Lara-Ruiz and Moham-
med). 
180 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 282 (1994) (“In this case, the 
event to which the new damages provision relates is the discriminatory conduct of re-
spondents’ agent . . . .”). 
181 Note that this logic parallels the argument made by lower courts in the immi-
gration context, that the conviction is what makes immigrants eligible for deportation 
and therefore for 212(c) relief.  See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the flawed logic of Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2001), that the con-
viction is the crucial act).  However, the Landgraf decision does not even mention the 
date on which the district court found that USI Film violated the law, showing that the 
Supreme Court did not even consider this argument. 
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Because Point A is the relevant act, even if USI Film was not held 
liable until after the new law took effect (see Figure 2 for this sce-
nario), the new law would still cause an impermissible retroactive ef-
fect as applied to the wrongful conduct.  In other words, because the 
unlawful conduct is the relevant point of analysis, it does not matter 
whether the defendant’s liability attaches before or after the change 





















The Landgraf decision also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
because intentional employment discrimination was illegal at the time 
of USI Film’s conduct, attaching new damage consequences to these 
acts was not a retroactive penalty.  The Court noted that just because 
the underlying conduct is “morally reprehensible or illegal,” and the 
defendant should be on notice not to behave this way, that does not 
mean that unlimited consequences can be heaped retroactively on the 
guilty party absent a statement of congressional intent to do so.182  The 
Court also acknowledged that even where an action is illegal, a defen-
dant company will not necessarily refrain from breaking the law; 
rather, a potential defendant might engage in a cost-benefit analysis of 
whether subjecting itself to liability would be worthwhile overall.183
182 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283 n.35. 
183 The Court acknowledged the possibility of this ex ante calculation by saying 
that the new damages provisions “can be expected to give managers an added incen-
tive to take preventive measures to ward off discriminatory conduct . . . before it occurs,”  
id. at 283 n.35, and can be expected to “have an impact on private parties’ planning,” 
id. at 282. 
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The Court’s reasoning in Hughes184 largely paralleled the Landgraf 
decision on the question of the relevant act for retroactivity analysis, 
analyzing the retroactivity question in reference to the alleged fraudu-
lent conduct by the company.185  Like Landgraf, the Hughes Court also 
quickly rejected the argument that because the company’s alleged 
conduct was illegal when it acted, it is permissible to expose it to in-
creased liability under a new law.186   
C.  The Martin v. Hadix Rules 
The Supreme Court’s most instructive decision on the question of 
the relevant act for retroactivity analysis came in Martin v. Hadix.187  
Martin involved ongoing attorneys’ fees awarded to monitor compli-
ance with a consent decree in a prison litigation case.188  Years after 
184  Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997).  Recall 
that the issue in that case was whether a new provision, which permitted qui tam suits 
under the False Claims Act where the government previously possessed information 
about the alleged corruption, could be used to sue a company for conduct occurring 
before the date of the new provision’s enactment.  Id. at 941. 
185 Though the Hughes Court declined to decide whether the relevant conduct was 
Hughes Aircraft’s submission of the allegedly false claim or the company’s financial 
disclosures to the government in the course of an audit, see id. at 946 n.4 (“Because 
both [acts] occurred prior to the effective date of the 1986 amendments, we need not 
address which of these two events constitutes the relevant conduct for purposes of our 
retroactivity analysis.”), the Court’s reasoning was focused on the possibility of an im-
permissible retroactive effect caused by changing the rules of qui tam suits after an al-
leged fraudulent violation has occurred, see id. at 945 (noting that “[t]he allegedly false 
claims at issue in this case were submitted by Hughes between 1982 and 1984”).  See 
also id. at 948-49 (concluding that the illegality of the submission of false claims does 
not preclude a finding of impermissible retroactive effect); id. at 948, 950 (arguing 
that the 1986 amendments do indeed create a new liability and a new cause of action 
for a company that is alleged to have submitted false claims); id. at 951 (holding that 
the 1986 amendments are not merely jurisdictional but impact whether a suit for sub-
mission of false claims “may be brought at all”).  Nowhere in the decision did the 
Court analyze whether the amendments would be retroactive as applied to Hughes 
Aircraft’s disclosure to the government.  Thus, while the Court said it did not select 
which past conduct was relevant, all its analysis was focused squarely on the alleged 
crime committed by the defendant. 
186 See id. at 947 (“The same argument was made, and rejected, in Landgraf .”). 
187 527 U.S. 343 (1999). 
188 The detailed facts and procedural posture of the case, located at Martin, 527 
U.S. at 349-50, are as follows:  The Martin case grew out of two successful class action 
suits brought by prisoners against the Michigan prison system in 1977 and 1980, under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 347-52.  The prisoners were successful in both actions, and the 
federal trial court ordered the semi-annual payment of attorneys’ fees, at the prevailing 
market rate, for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the court’s decrees in 
both cases.  By 1995, the prevailing market rate for attorneys was $150 per hour.  The 
amount of the attorneys’ fees payable to the prisoners’ attorneys was brought into 
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the fees were established, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) set 
new fee structures that were lower than the amount originally 
awarded.189  The question before the Court was whether the new fee 
cap could be applied to cases where an ongoing attorneys’ fee struc-
ture had already been put in place.  The Justices unanimously agreed 
that the statute did not expressly authorize retroactive application of 
the new fee structure; however, this left the question of whether a ret-
roactive effect would occur by applying the new law to past acts. 
The major point of disagreement among the Justices involved 
what qualified as a “past act.”  As Justice Scalia pointed out in his con-
currence, there were at least five separate points that could have been 
chosen as the relevant one:  (1) the alleged violation that was the basis 
of the suit that gave rise to attorneys’ fees; (2) the attorney’s decision 
to bring the suit; (3) the filing of the suit; (4) the “doing of the legal 
work” that was the basis for the fees; or (5) the award by the court of 
attorneys’ fees.190
Both the majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurrence con-
cluded that Point 4 was the relevant act, meaning that the fee cap 
could be applied to work done by the lawyers after passage of the new 
law, but not before.191  The majority reasoned that: 
After April 26, 1996, any expectation of compensation at the pre-PLRA 
rates was unreasonable.  There is no manifest injustice in telling an at-
torney performing postjudgment monitoring services that, going for-
ward, she will earn a lower hourly rate than she had earned in the past.  
If the attorney does not wish to perform services at this new, lower pay 
rate, she can choose not to work.  In other words, as applied to work per-
question by the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. 
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, on April 26, 1996.  The PLRA contains various meas-
ures regulating (and often limiting) the conduct of prison litigation in the federal 
court system.  At issue in Martin was section 803(d)(3) of the PLRA, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (1994), which capped attorneys’ fees in prison litigation suits to no 
greater than 150% of the hourly rate permitted under federal law for court-appointed 
counsel.  Because court-appointed attorneys in the Eastern District of Michigan were 
paid a maximum of $75 an hour, the PLRA required payment of no more than 
$112.50 for attorneys’ fees in prison litigation suits in that district.  Martin, 527 U.S. at 
350. 
189 PLRA § 803(d) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). 
190 Martin, 527 U.S. at 362-63 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The question at each of 
these five points would be whether the PLRA has a retroactive effect, that is, whether 
the PLRA’s lower fee cap attached a new legal consequence to each of these past acts. 
191 See id. at 360 (“To impose the new standards now, for work performed before 
the PLRA became effective, would upset the reasonable expectations of the parties.”); 
id. at 364 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he relevant retroactivity event is the doing of the 
work for which the incentive was offered.”). 
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formed after the effective date of the PLRA, the PLRA has future effect 
on future work; this does not raise retroactivity concerns.
192
While the majority does not clearly state the decision rule that it 
adopts, the majority seems to select the point in time where the actor 
could choose to avoid all the consequences of the new law.193  On this 
basis, the Court rejects the prisoners’ argument that the relevant act is 
the attorneys’ filing of the cases in 1977 and 1980 (Point 2), because 
the argument wrongly assumes that “the attorney’s initial decision to 
file a case on behalf of a client is an irrevocable one.”194  In other 
words, the attorneys could still avoid the consequences of the PLRA by 
ceasing to work on the case once the new law was passed. 
Interestingly, the dissent in Martin appears to adopt the same de-
cisional rule as the majority, but finds that the parties could have 
avoided the consequences of the new law only at a much earlier 
point—at the time the attorneys chose to represent the prisoners 
(Point 2).195
The rule adopted by the majority and the dissent is based on the 
concern that when a party cannot avoid the consequences of a new 
law, attaching new consequences to prior acts would result in a mani-
fest injustice.196  It is logical to draw this line based on injustice; after 
192 Id. at 360. 
193 See id. at 358 (“The PLRA, as applied to work performed before its effective 
date, would alter the fee arrangement post hoc by reducing the rate of compensation.  
To give effect to the PLRA’s fees limitations, after the fact, would ‘attac[h] new legal 
consequences’ to completed conduct.” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
244, 270 (1994))); see also Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383, 398 (4th Cir. 2004) (rely-
ing on the Martin holding to support the proposition that “[n]otification is only rele-
vant to the extent that it provides a party an opportunity to avoid future conse-
quences”). 
194 Martin, 527 U.S. at 361. 
195 See id. at 369 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Applying § 803(d) to pending matters 
significantly alters the consequences of the representation on which the lawyer has 
embarked.”).  The dissent’s adoption of the majority’s rule is indicated by its statement 
that after the lawyers choose to bring the suits they have “little leeway to alter their 
conduct in response to the new legal regime.”  Id.  On this point, Justice Ginsburg 
quotes approvingly from Judge Wald’s dissent in Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F.3d 
1357, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998):  “[T]he triggering event for retroactivity purposes . . . is 
when the lawyer undertakes to litigate the civil rights action on behalf of the client.”  
Martin, 527 U.S. at 371 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion is based on the ethical requirement that attorneys carry 
through their representation of clients to conclusion.  See id. at 371 (citing MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1999) and MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1999)). 
196  Martin, 527 U.S. at 360 (“There is no manifest injustice in telling an attorney 
performing post-judgment monitoring services that, going forward, she will earn a 
lower hourly rate than she had earned in the past.”); id. at 370 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
 
784 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 741 
 
all, the reason our system has a presumption against retroactivity ab-
sent a clear congressional mandate is that we view retroactive laws as 
unjust. 
The difficulty, of course, with simply adopting injustice or reliance 
as the rule for judging retroactive effect, as Justice Scalia notes in his 
concurrence, is that, “[i]n varying degrees,” applying the new law to 
any of the five potential acts (Points A-E) would “frustrate expecta-
tions.”197  Instead, he suggests the following helpful rule: 
I think the decision of which reference point (which “retroactivity 
event”) to select should turn upon which activity the statute was in-
tended to regulate.  If it was intended to affect primary conduct, [Point 
1] should govern; if it was intended to induce lawyers to undertake rep-
resentation, [Point 2]—and so forth.
198
Justice Scalia takes a broad, common sense approach to determin-
ing the purpose of the PLRA.  Acknowledging that “viewed in isola-
tion” the purpose of the PLRA could be seen as “simply to prevent a 
judicial award of fees in excess of the referenced amount [Point 5],”199 
Justice Scalia argues that the underlying purpose of the original stat-
ute, which the PLRA amended, was “to provide an appropriate incen-
tive for lawyers to work on . . . prisoner suits.”200  The reference point, 
then, should be Point 4, because the statute was focused on “the doing 
of the work” on prisoner cases.201
D.  The Martin Rules Applied to the 212(c) Context 
Under either of Martin’s decisional rules, the relevant reference 
point in the 212(c) context is the commission of the crime.  This can 
be demonstrated by applying Martin’s two rules to a hypothetical 
212(c) case in which the immigrant first committed a crime, was sub-
ing) (“There is scarcely greater injustice in denying pre-PLRA compensation for pre-
trial discovery in the one case than the other”.). 
197 Id. at 363 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
198 Id.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Martin reiterates the retroactive effect rule 
he suggested in his Landgraf concurrence, which was joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas.  See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 291 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The critical issue, I 
think, is not whether the rule affects ‘vested rights,’ or governs substance or proce-
dure, but rather what is the relevant activity that the rule regulates.  Absent clear 
statement otherwise, only such relevant activity which occurs after the effective date of 
the statute is covered.”). 
199 Martin, 527 U.S. at 363. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 364. 
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sequently convicted of the crime, and only then encounters IIRIRA’s 
repeal of 212(c) relief. 
Under the rule adopted by both the majority and dissent in Mar-
tin, our hypothetical court would ask, “At what point in time could an 
immigrant have ensured that she would have avoided the conse-
quences of IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c)?”  The answer is that she could 
only ensure that she would not be subject to IIRIRA’s elimination of 
the discretionary waiver at the time she committed the crime.  Once 
she commits her crime, she cannot ensure that she will avoid convic-
tion, and, therefore, IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c). 
In contrast, under Justice Scalia’s proposed rule from Martin, our 
court would ask:  “What was the purpose of the new law, and what ac-
tions was it intended to regulate?”  In the narrow sense, it could be 
said that IIRIRA’s repeal of 212(c) was intended to ensure the depor-
tation of those immigrants who had been convicted of aggravated felo-
nies.  But, following Justice Scalia’s admonition to look at the broader, 
common sense purpose of the original act, it seems that repealing the 
waiver was intended to regulate primary conduct in two ways:  first, by 
providing a disincentive for immigrants to commit certain crimes, and 
second, to remove certain types of immigrant law-breakers from the 
United States.  The driving force behind repeal is not to deport peo-
ple who courts have labeled as aggravated felons, but to deport people 
who pose a danger to society because they have committed certain 
crimes.202  It is not their conviction for crimes that causes concern 
about their presence in the United States, but the fact that they com-
mitted certain crimes at all.  Therefore, it would be impermissibly ret-
roactive to attach the new legal consequence of the repeal of 212(c) 
to immigrants who committed their crimes prior to the enactment of 
IIRIRA. 
In summary, under either decisional rule offered in Martin, and 
under the holdings of both Landgraf and Hughes, the commission of 
the crime is the relevant point of analysis for 212(c) retroactivity deci-
sions.  Despite St. Cyr’s command that retroactivity analysis should 
fully apply in the immigration context, the lower courts have generally 
not accepted the commission-of-the-crime argument.203  The few 
202 See, e.g., Mohammed v. Reno, 205 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Few 
people would disagree with [petitioner’s] assertion that he has been ordered deported 
because he committed a property crime, not because he was convicted of it a year 
later.”). 
203 See supra Part III.A (discussing the rule that the relevant event for retroactivity 
analysis is not commission but conviction). 
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courts that have undertaken a full analysis of the retroactive effect in 
reference to the commission of the crime have concluded that the 
commission of the crime is the relevant event.204  But those cases have 
been universally overturned on appeal, and no circuit currently holds 
that the commission of the crime is the relevant act for retroactive ef-
fect analysis.205
E.  A Persistent Refusal To Apply Landgraf? 
While the courts have easily viewed the commission of the crime 
as the relevant reference point for cases involving corporate wrongdo-
ers like USI Film and Hughes Aircraft, they have refused to do so in 
the case of immigrant wrongdoers.  Perhaps courts find the notion of 
immigrants contemplating the costs of individual crime—be it white 
collar crime (as in Ponnapula) or street crime (as in St. Cyr), beyond 
the pale, even absurd.  Yet, both Landgraf and Hughes forcefully re-
jected the notion that normal retroactivity rules do not apply if the 
underlying activity is illegal. 
This willingness of courts to apply one set of retroactivity rules to 
most retroactivity cases and another set to retroactivity cases involving 
immigrants is the sort of incongruity that St. Cyr was supposed to put 
an end to.  With Ponnapula and Olatunji helping to return 212(c) ret-
roactivity analysis to the framework of Landgraf, it is possible that 
lower courts will engage the commission-of-the-crime argument.  At 
the very least, courts should seriously analyze the proposition, cease 
relying on the LaGuerre dicta, and systematically consider the Landgraf, 
Hughes, and Martin holdings as applied to the 212(c) context. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent circuit court decisions in Ponnapula and Olatunji offer 
hope that retroactivity analysis in the immigration context will finally 
conform to the framework of Landgraf and its progeny.  While the Su-
preme Court’s landmark decision in St. Cyr required full application 
of retroactivity analysis in the immigration context,206 the lower courts 
have largely failed to follow this dictate. 
204 Id. 
205 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (listing circuit court decisions that 
limit St. Cyr to the plea bargain context). 
206 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324 (2000) (rejecting the INS argument that 
“application of the law of deportation can never have a retroactive effect”). 
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Instead the lower courts have continued to ignore the clear 
framework of Landgraf and its progeny:  (1) retroactivity analysis fun-
damentally involves statutory construction—an inquiry into the con-
gressionally-mandated scope of the statute as to an entire class, not 
into individual, subjective reliance on the prior state of the law; (2) 
unfairness and the potential for reliance on the current state of the 
law are the reasons for the strong presumption against retroactivity, 
rather than the test for a retroactive effect; and the presumption 
against retroactivity is not a right to be earned by individuals, but a 
protection granted to all members of the class; (3) if Congress did not 
expressly mandate retroactive application of a statute, there is a pre-
sumption against retroactivity and a court may not permit any applica-
tion that would cause a retroactive effect; to do otherwise would be 
nothing less than judicial legislation; (4) a retroactive effect occurs 
when a new law attaches new legal consequences to past acts; and (5) 
determining which past acts are relevant for the retroactive effect in-
quiry requires a clear test.  The majority and dissent in Martin ask at 
what point a party could ensure it would not be subject to any of the 
new law’s consequences; Scalia’s concurrence suggests asking what the 
purpose of the statute is and what conduct it seeks to regulate.  Under 
either of Martin’s decisional rules, the relevant event for analysis of a 
retroactive effect in the 212(c) context is the commission of the un-
derlying crime. 
Following repeal of 212(c) relief in 1996, it took six years of misdi-
rected decisions before the Supreme Court in St. Cyr ordered lower 
courts to fully apply its retroactivity jurisprudence to the immigration 
context.  During those six years, many permanent residents were 
summarily deported without their rightful opportunity to apply for a 
waiver of deportation.  Today, because the lower courts continue to 
incorrectly apply the retroactivity framework in 212(c) cases, perma-
nent residents who committed their crime or turned down a plea offer 
and proceeded to trial before passage of IIRIRA continue to be de-
nied the right to apply for the waiver of deportation to which they are 
entitled. 
Hopefully, the recent decisions in the Third and Fourth Circuits 
will encourage other circuits to revisit their 212(c) decisions and fully 
apply Landgraf to these cases.  To do less results in just the unfairness, 
overreaching, and judicial legislation that the presumption against 
retroactivity was designed to prevent. 
 
